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INTRODUCTION 
This case was commenced on behalf of the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family 
Trust ("Trust") by Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman, two of its four cotrustees. The 
trial court granted Intervener (and cotrustee) Dorothy Westling's motion to dismiss for 
lack of standing but without converting it to a motion for summary judgment. Further, 
the trial court failed to consider Ms. Westling's statutory duty to the beneficiaries of the 
Trust, regardless of her desire to protect her son, Mark Westling. Plaintiffs, as cotrustees 
of the Trust, have standing as a matter of law to bring an action against a debtor of the 
Trust. Moreover, they have a statutory duty to administer the Trust solely in the interests 
of the beneficiaries and to do so with impartiality. 
Notwithstanding this lawful standing and duty, the trial court granted Ms. Westling's 
motion to dismiss for lack of standing. In doing so, the trial court stated that its decision 
"did not hinge on Ms. Westling's Affidavit.', Logically, however, the trial court had to 
rely on Ms. Westling's affidavit to reach its conclusion. 
The Trust was created in 1993 by Ms. Westling and her now deceased husband. The 
Trust currently has four cotrustees: Ms. Westling (Intervener) and her son, Mark Westling 
(Defendant), and two of her daughters (Plaintiffs). The Trust provides for Ms. Westling 
and her seven children, one of whom is disabled and he is the primary beneficiary of the 
Trust upon Ms. Westling's death. 
1 
Ms. Westling is 88 years old, has mild dementia, and in 2007 when it became clear 
that she needed daily assistance, she moved to Arizona to live with her son, Mark. The 
Plaintiffs reside in Salt Lake City, Utah, and they are the cotrustees who actually 
administer the Trust. The principal asset of the Trust is a rental home where 
Ms. Westling resided before she moved to Arizona. The home was and is intended to 
benefit Ms. Westling's disabled son upon the passing of Ms. Westling. The other six 
children inherit whatever estate remains upon the passing of Jonathan, the disabled son. 
Acting in their capacity as cotrustees, Plaintiffs commenced a lawsuit against Mark to 
collect on a $7,000 debt that Mark owed to the Trust. They also sought to recover from 
Mark $40,000, the amount of the down payment the Trust provided to him to purchase a 
home in Arizona so that Ms. Westling could reside there with him. Without informing his 
cotrustees, Mark purchased a home but did not include his mother on the title. More 
damaging, Mark soon thereafter lost the home in a foreclosure. In effect, the Trust lost a 
total of $47,000 from Mark's conduct and such amount was obtained through a mortgage 
on the Trust's rental property which the Trust is now obligated to repay. 
As provided by the Uniform Trust Code, Plaintiffs have a lawful duty to collect on a 
debt owed to the Trust and to administer the Trust solely and impartially in the interest of 
the beneficiaries. As provided by the Trust document, Ms. Westling has the power to 
resolve any disputes between the cotrustees. However, as a matter of law, Ms. Westling 
can't thwart the statutory duty imposed on her cotrustees, including herself as a cotrustee. 
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The Trust document contains no language that requires any prior consent or 
affirmative permission from Ms. Westling before a cotrustee can act. Rather, 
Ms. Westling may assert her wishes concerning any disagreement between the cotrustees 
and her decision governs. In effect, the Trust provides Ms. Westling the power to speak 
and authoritatively express her wishes, but the Trust doesn't by itself speak for her. 
Ms. Westling's affidavit was her only means of expression in this case. The trial court 
could not logically conclude that Ms. Westling did not want her cotrustees to bring an 
action against the Defendant unless the trial court considered Ms. Westling's affidavit. 
Once it did that, it should have converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary 
judgment. Equally important, the trial court should not have allowed Ms. Westling's 
voice to contravene Ms. Westling's statutory duty as cotrustee. That is, by allowing 
Ms. Westling to stop these proceedings, Ms. Westling was favoring her son, Mark, over 
all of the other beneficiaries, thus failing to act solely in the interests of the beneficiaries 
and to do so with impartiality. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78A-3-102, U.C.A. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue 1; Issues related to whether the trial court erred in granting Dorothy Westling's 
request to intervene. 
Determinative Law: Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governs the right and 
procedure for a person to intervene in a case, and Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, j^ 13 
sets forth a four-part test to qualify for intervention. 
Standard of Review: Questions of whether the correct legal standards were applied 
are questions of law and are reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). Since this is a mixed question of fact and law, some 
deference may be given to the trial court depending on the circumstances. See Dept. of 
Human Services v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997). 
Issue 2: Issues related to whether the trial court erred in granting Dorothy Westling's 
motion to dismiss without first converting it to a motion for summary judgment and 
where the motion to dismiss contended that Plaintiffs lacked standing based solely on the 
Trust language and Ms. Westling's affidavit. 
Determinative Law: Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governs when a 
motion to dismiss should be converted to a motion for summary judgment. 
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Standard of Review: Questions of whether the correct legal standards were applied 
when a trial court grants a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is reviewed for correctness. 
See generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Oakwood Vill. LLC. v. 
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101 f 9. The question of whether a given individual has 
standing is primarily a question of law, although there may be factual findings that bear 
on the issue. See Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997); 
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74 1J13. Questions 
of fact are reviewed for clear error while legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. 
See Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658,659 (Utah 1988). 
Issue 3: Issues related to whether the trial court erred in denying the Rule 59 Motion 
to vacate the trial court's order dismissing the case. 
Determinative Law: Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governs requests to 
vacate or modify orders issued by the trial court. 
Standard of Review: The denial of a Rule 59 Motion by a trial court is normally 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. However, where a trial court relies on its 
interpretation of an external document, the review falls under a correctness standard. 
See Booth v. Booth, 2006 UT App 144 TflO {citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 
937, 938 (Utah 1993)). 
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KEY LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The following legal provisions are included in Addendum A. 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) 
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24 
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 
4. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-201 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802 
8. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-803 
9. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-809 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-810 
11. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-814 
12. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a collection and recovery case brought by Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman, 
Appellants/Plaintiffs and two of the cotrustees of the Trust. Defendant Mark Westling is 
also a cotrustee. The Appellee/Intervener is the fourth cotrustee and is also the mother of 
the other cotrustees. She is also one of the grantors of the Trust; the other grantor, her 
husband, is deceased. 
This should have been a straightforward collection case brought by a Trust for the 
benefit of the Trust's beneficiaries. But it is complicated because the Intervener, who is a 
cotrustee, 88 years of age, and is frail with some recognized dementia, resides in Arizona 
with Defendant Mark. Importantly, she is totally dependent on Defendant Mark, who is 
also a cotrustee in this case. This makes for an interesting and convoluted dynamic 
situation since the Intervener, Ms. Westling, depends solely on Defendant Mark with 
whom she resides and allegedly desires to protect him against any collection efforts.1 
To complicate matters further, Ms. Westling, through her attorney, refused to be 
deposed in the State of Utah or to testify in the State of Utah. So, the only "voice" of 
1
 Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss and her Motion to Intervene asserts that her 
interest is to avoid litigation expenses for the Trust. However, that is not a credible 
assertion since Plaintiffs' collection efforts intend to recover $47,000 for the Trust, and 
Ms. Westling appears willing to spend any amount to prevent Plaintiffs from collecting 
against Mark. Had Ms. Westling not intervened, the litigation would have been 
concluded quickly and inexpensively. As it is, Plaintiffs are paying out of their own 
pockets for this litigation in order to preserve the Trust for their disabled brother. 
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Ms. Westling in this case is from an affidavit that was drafted by her Utah attorney and 
sent to Arizona for her to sign under the guidance and oversight of Defendant Mark. This 
certainly raises the suspicion of undue influence2 and raises issues of whether 
Ms. Westling clearly knew and understood what she was signing when she signed her 
affidavit. No hearings were ever held in this case. 
Since the Trust provides the Intervener with power to resolve disagreements among 
the cotrustees, Ms. Westling filed a motion to intervene and then filed a motion to dismiss 
the case against her son, Mark. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss but the court 
denied that it relied on Ms. Westling's affidavit in reaching its decision. Unfortunately, 
Ms. Westling's statutory duty as a cotrustee was never addressed by the trial court. 
B. Course of Proceedings/Disposition in the District Court Below. 
The cotrustees filed their collection complaint on April 7, 2009. (R. 1; Add. B. 
at B015.) Defendant Mark filed his answer on May 13, 2009 (R. 11.) On July 8, 2009, 
Ms. Westling filed her motion to intervene. (R. 63; Add. B. at B020.) On 
August 18,2009, the trial court granted the motion to intervene. (R. 177; Add. B. 
atB035.) 
2
 "A confidential relationship arises when one party, having gained the trust and 
confidence of another, exercises extraordinary influence over the other party." Kuhre v. 
Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 85, PI 8, 69 P.3d 286 (quotations and citation omitted):' And, 
"If a confidential relationship is found, any transaction that benefits the party in whom 
trust is reposed is presumed to have been unfair and to have resulted from undue 
influence and fraud." In re Estate ofTolley, 2007 UT App 129 (quoting Webster v. 
Lehmer, 742 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1987) (quoting Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 
378,401 P.2d 710, 713 (1965)). 
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On July 27, 2009, Ms. Westling filed her motion to dismiss for lack of standing. 
(R. 109; Add. B. B037.) On September 11, 2009, the trial court granted Ms. Westling's 
motion to dismiss. (R. 191; Add. B. B058.) On September 15,2009, the cotrustees filed 
their Rule 59 Motion (R. 195; B. at B061.) and on October 21, 2009, the trial court denied 
the Rule 59 Motion. (R. 217; Add. B. at B079.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Trust Generally, 
On August 6, 1993, the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust (the "Trust") 
was created. (R. 74-87; Add. B. at B001-B014.) Concurrently with its creation, the Trust 
identified its cotrustees as the two Grantors and three of their seven surviving children in 
order: Joy Ann W Greenwood, Ellen W. Hardman, and Mark Westling. (R. 74; 
Add. B. at BOOL) The primary beneficiary of the Trust upon the deaths of the grantors is 
Jonathan Kip Westling, a disabled son of the grantors. (R. 77; Add. B. at B004.) The 
three surviving cotrustees are then directed by the terms of the Trust to hold and 
administer the assets of the Trust in a "special needs" trust known as the 
Jonathan Kip Westling Trust. Id. Upon the death of Jonathan, any remaining assets are 
to be distributed to the six surviving children of the grantors or to their issue if any of 
them predecease the surviving grantor. (R. 80; Add. B. at B007.) Upon the death of 
either grantor, the Trust becomes irrevocable and the surviving grantor has no power to 
9 
amend, revoke or terminate the Trust. (R. 83; Add. B. at BO 10.) Therefore, the Trust is 
now and was for all relevant periods of time during these proceedings irrevocable. 
B. Powers and duties of the cotrustees. 
The cotrustees are granted by the terms of the Trust all of the rights and powers 
conferred upon them by § 75-7-402, U.C.A., as amended. (R. 84; Add. B. at B011.) In 
addition, as a matter of law, the cotrustees have a duty to administer the trust solely in the 
interests of the beneficiaries. § 75-7-802, U.C.A. Further, if a trust has two or more 
beneficiaries, as here, the cotrustees have a duty to act impartially in investing, managing, 
and distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries1 respective 
interests. § 75-7-803, U.C.A. 
The Trust document provides that in the event the cotrustees are unable to agree on 
any matter in the administration of the Trust after the death of either grantor, the decision 
of the surviving grantor is to "govern" so long as the surviving grantor is competent. 
(R. 85;Add.B.atB012.) 
C. Loan and Advance to Mark. 
In the summer of 2007, the Trust, at Defendant Mark's express request, loaned to him 
the amount of $7,000, which amount was to be promptly repaid with interest. (R. 2; 
Add. B. at B016.) In addition, the Trust advanced to Defendant the amount of $40,000 
for the purpose of purchasing a home for him and for his mother, Ms. Westling. Id. The 
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Trust obtained the $40,000 and the $7,000 by taking out a mortgage on the home owned 
by the Trust, by and through its cotrustees. Id. 
Defendant Mark used the $40,000 to purchase a home in Arizona but he failed to 
include his mother, Ms. Westling, as an owner on the title of the home or to make any 
other equitable provisions for her. Id. Further, Defendant Mark failed to make timely 
payments on his mortgage and the home was taken in a foreclosure or deed in lieu of 
foreclosure; at any rate, the entire $40,000 was lost and the Trust is now responsible for 
repaying $40,000 by way of the mortgage it took against the Trust's property. Id. As a 
result of Defendant Mark's failure to repay the $7,000, the Trust is also damaged by that 
amount plus accrued interest. (R. 3; Add. B. at B017.) 
During the negotiations for the advancement of the $40,000 to purchase a home for 
Defendant Mark and his mother, Mark represented to his cotrustees, Plaintiffs herein, 
that he had the financial means to sustain a mortgage and thereby protect the $40,000 in 
equity in the home that was to be purchased. Id. Plaintiffs relied on Mark's 
representations that he could and would protect the $40,000 advancement and equity in 
the home where he and his mother would reside. Id. Had Plaintiffs known that Mark's 
financial condition was so fragile, they would never have advanced to him funds from the 
Trust. Id. 
Mark knew or should have known of his fragile financial condition at the time he 
accepted the $40,000 from the Trust, but he intentionally or negligently failed to advise 
11 
his cotrustees so that they could have made an informed decision about advancing the 
Trust's funds to him. Id. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS 
The trial court entered three relevant rulings in this case: 
1. On August 18, 2009, the trial court granted Ms. Westling's Motion to Intervene. 
(R. 177;Add.B.atB035.) 
2. On September 11, 2009, the trial court granted Ms. Westling's motion to dismiss. 
(R. 191;Add.B.B058.) 
3. On October 21,2009, the trial court denied Appellant's Rule 59 Motion. (R. 217; 
Add.B.atB079.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The two cotrustees who provide the administration of the Trust were prevented from 
collecting $47,000 from their brother, Mark, who is another cotrustee. Their mother, 
Ms. Westling, another cotrustee, first filed a motion to intervene and then filed a motion 
to dismiss with her affidavit claiming that her daughters who filed this action don't have 
standing to do so. The trial court first referenced her desire that the cotrustees refrain 
from taking this action and then granted the motion to dismiss without converting it to a 
motion for summary judgment. That was in error, since the motion to dismiss for lack of 
standing should have been considered as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and not under one of the 
other subparts of Rule 12(b). 
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At first, Ms. Westling only referred to Rule 12 without designating which subpart 
should govern her defense. Later, in response to a Rule 59 Motion, she identified that 
subpart (b)(1) or perhaps subpart (b)(2) should govern, although she couldn't identify 
which subpart. None of the subparts (b)(l)-(b)(5) of Rule 12 cover or govern "standing" 
issues. Subparts (b)(1) and (b)(2) govern matter and personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs 
contend that a motion to dismiss should fall under Rule 12(b)(6), and therefore the motion 
should be converted to a motion for summary judgment. 
The trial court may have considered Rule 12(b)(6). However, it is not clear since the 
trial court never identified which subpart of Rule 12 governs the motion to dismiss. 
Regardless, the trial court erred by either (1) considering Ms. Westling's affidavit; or 
(2) incorrectly interpreting the Trust instrument. 
The Trust instrument is void of any requirement that the cotrustees must first obtain 
Ms. Westling's consent before commencing an action against their brother. Therefore, 
the Trust document itself is insufficient to lead to a conclusion that the cotrustees have no 
standing. On the other hand, if the trial court considered Ms. Westling's affidavit, which 
is most likely, the trial court erred by not converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for 
summary judgment. The trial court first refers to Ms. Westling's desires, and then later 
states that its decision did not "hinge" on her affidavit. 
Similarly, if the trial court erred with respect to the motion to dismiss, then the trial 
court also erred by not granting the Rule 59 Motion. 
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The trial court also erred by granting Ms. Westling's motion to intervene since she 
failed to show why her interests were not adequately protected by her cotrustees. 
Ms. Westling also failed to consider her statutory duty as a cotrustee to administer the 
Trust solely for the benefit of its beneficiaries and to do so with impartiality. To the 
contrary, Ms. Westling's intention was solely to protect the Defendant, her son, with 
whom she resides in Arizona and upon whom she is totally dependent. Therefore, her 
intervention to protect her son and not the beneficiaries of the Trust is against public 
policy where she has a statutory duty to consider all of the beneficiaries equally. 
ARGUMENT 
"Standing issues are issues of law reviewed for correctness. However, for purposes 
of evaluating a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the complaint are to be considered 
as true, with any inferences drawn in favor of the Plaintiffs9 claims." Haymondv. 
Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27 P5 (citing Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. 
Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997); Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 
910 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1996). 
I. The trial court erred by not converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for 
summary judgment. 
It is important to first discuss which subpart of Rule 12(b), Utah R. Civ. P., applies to 
this case since different procedural requirements apply depending on which subpart is 
implicated. The trial court treated Ms. Westling9 s motion to dismiss as though 
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Rule 12(b)(6) was not implicated, although the trial court never identified which subpart 
of Rule 12(b) was implicated or on which subpart of Rule 12(b) the trial court relied. 
(See R. 191-193; 217-218; Add. B. at B058-060; B079-081.) 
A. Rule 12(b)(6) governs the Motion to Dismiss. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court should have converted Ms. Westling's Motion to 
Dismiss to a motion for summary judgment as required by Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P. 
Ms. Westling contends that her motion to dismiss was brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) 
or perhaps Rule 12(b)(2), although Ms. Westling never makes it clear as to which subpart 
of Rule 12(b) she brought her motion. (R. 109-116; R. 169-175; Add. B. B037-050.) 
Appearing to be unsure of what provision to raise, her motion simply refers to "Rule 12" 
without any mention of which subpart is relevant. (R. 109; Add. B. atB037.) Similarly, 
in Ms. Westling's memorandum in support of her motion to dismiss, she likewise appears 
uncertain since she again failed to refer to any particular subpart of Rule 12. (R. 112; 
Add. B. at B039.) In fact, other than the opening sentence in her memorandum in support 
of her motion to dismiss, she failed entirely to even mention Rule 12 or any of its 
subparts. (R. 109-116; Add. B. at B020-043.) 
Only in response to Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion did Ms. Westling finally refer to any 
subparts of Rule 12(b). (R. 206; Add. B. at B075.) Her memorandum first denies that her 
motion to dismiss was based on Rule 12(b)(6). Id. She then goes on to merely cite to but 
not discuss Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2). Id. Instead, Ms. Westling glibly glosses over the 
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distinction between standing and jurisdiction as "jurisdiction" is used in Rule 12(b)(1) 
and Rule 12(b)(2). 
It appears that Ms. Westling confuses the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and 
standing. "Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority and competency of the court to 
decide the case, see 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1350 (1969), while standing concerns whether 'the plaintiff has a legally protectible and 
tangible interest at stake in the litigation.5 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (6th ed. 1991). 
Munfordv. Lee Servicing, Co., 2000 UT 108 at footnote 3 
The first five subparts of Rule 12(b) which do not require the conversion of a motion 
to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment are: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of 
process; and (5) insufficiency of service of process. Since Ms. Westling only cites to 
subparts (1) and (2), and since the trial court didn't cite to any subpart, it seems 
appropriate to limit the discussion to the first two subparts, both of which contain the term 
"jurisdiction." 
1. The trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. 
The subject matter involved in this case includes a routine debt collection matter 
brought about on behalf of a trust. "The district court has original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by 
law." § 78A-5-102, U.C.A. With respect to trusts, "[tjhe [district] court has exclusive 
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jurisdiction of proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the internal affairs of 
trusts" and these proceedings include "(i) the administration and distribution of trusts; 
(ii) the declaration of rights; and (iii) the determination of other matters involving trustees 
and beneficiaries of trusts. § 75-7-201, U.C.A. 
Neither Ms. Westling nor the trial court contend that the trial court lacks jurisdiction 
over the subject matter before it. Moreover, Ms. Westling never once argued that the trial 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, Ms. Westling wrongly labeled her 
motion as falling under Rule 12(b)(1) but without any support of why the trial court might 
or does lack jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
2. The trial court has jurisdiction over Defendant Mark Westling. 
Mark was properly served as required by Rule 4, Utah R. Civ. P. (R. 10.) The record 
is void of any discussion about whether or not the trial court lacks jurisdiction over 
Defendant Mark Westling. Neither Ms. Westling, nor Mark Westling, nor the trial court 
ever suggest or contend that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over Mark Westling. 
Therefore, Rule 12(b)(2) is not implicated. 
3. A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is brought under Rule 12(b)(6). 
Ms. Westling, once she was allowed to intervene, could always bring a motion that 
Plaintiffs lacked standing, but that's not a motion under Rule 12(b)(1). There are five 
specific defenses set forth by Rule 12(b), but none include "lack of standing" as a 
permissible defense, except under Rule 12(b)(6): "failure to state a claim upon which 
17 
relief can be granted." That is, if a plaintiff lacks standing, then the plaintiff cannot state 
a valid claim for relief. That makes sense, and that is exactly what Ms. Westling claimed 
in this case. To wit: she asserts that her desire govern's any dispute between the 
cotrustees, and she has stated by way of her affidavit that she doesn't want her cotrustees 
to pursue the collection of the debt owed to the Trust by her son, Mark. That is a 
legitimate position to take, but it falls under Rule 12(b)(6) and not under any of the 
subparts (1) through (5) of Rule 12(b). 
Therefore, Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P., should govern the procedural aspects of 
how the trial court should have viewed and treated Ms. Westling's motion to dismiss. 
B. Rule 12(b)(6) requires converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for 
summary judgment. 
When the trial court considered Ms. Westling's affidavit and didn't exclude it, 
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P., requires the trial court to treat her motion to dismiss "as 
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided by Rule 56." As such, "all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a 
motion by Rule 56." Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P. 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs would contend, if given the opportunity, that the 
affidavit, signed by Ms. Westling in Arizona under the supervision and control of 
Defendant Mark, was signed under his direction and influence. Or in the alternative, that 
Ms. Westling was not sufficiently able to understand the import of her affidavit. After 
all, the affidavit was prepared by Ms. Westling's attorney in Utah and sent to her in 
18 
Arizona.3 She wasn't in her attorney's office where he could explain the affidavit to her 
or answer questions she may have. Plaintiffs would also likely contend, if given the 
opportunity, that a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between Ms. Westling and 
Mark, thereby giving rise to the presumption that Mark may have exercised undue 
influence over Ms. Westling when she signed her affidavit. Without converting the 
motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs were denied any 
opportunity to raise issues of material fact that are in dispute, and Ms. Westling's 
affidavit clearly contains material facts. 
The trial court's minute entry denying Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion states the 
following: "The Court's decision, in considering this matter, did not hinge on 
Ms. Westling's Affidavit, but was instead focused on the Trust language to determine 
whether she had ultimate decision-making authority with respect to Trust matters." 
(R. 218; Add. B. at B081.) However, in the trial court's minute entry granting 
Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss, the trial court states the following: "Ms. Westling 
indicated that she does not consent to the litigation being initiated on behalf of the Trust 
against Mark Westling, who is her son and a fourth Co-Trustee of the Trust." (R. 191-92; 
Add.B.atB058-059.) 
3
 In a parallel proceeding, Plaintiffs and their siblings declared that their mother's 
affidavit could not possibly have been her words based on their close relationship over 
many decades. However, Plaintiffs were not given the opportunity to challenge the 
validity of Ms. Westling's affidavit. 
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Nowhere in the trial court's rulings is there any mention that Ms. Westling's affidavit 
was excluded. See Add. B. Clearly, in granting Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss, the 
trial court relied on Ms. Westling's affidavit. Otherwise, how could the trial court 
conclude that she doesn't consent to this litigation? Certainly mere argument doesn't rise 
to the level of admissible testimony. Further, in denying Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion, the 
trial court doesn't state that it didn't rely on Ms. Westling's affidavit. Rather, the trial 
court merely states that its decision didn't "hinge" on her affidavit, implying that it was a 
factor but not the deciding factor. (R. 218; Add. B. at B081.) 
Nonetheless, without Ms. Westling's affidavit, it is not logically possible to grasp or 
understand or even remotely know of Ms. Westling's desires with respect to this 
litigation. While the language of the Trust may grant Ms. Westling power to "govern" 
disagreements among the four cotrustees, the Trust document doesn't speak for 
Ms. Westling. Her voice can only be heard through her personal testimony, and in this 
instance her testimony is her affidavit on which the trial court relied and didn't exclude. 
II. The trial court erred by not granting Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion. 
The denial of a Rule 59 Motion by a trial court is normally reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. However, where the trial court, as here, relied on its interpretation of the Trust 
document, the review falls under a correctness standard. See Booth v. Booth, 
2006 UT App 144 ^ [10 (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 
(Utah 1993)). In denying Plantiffs' Rule 59 Motion, the trial court expressly stated that 
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its decision '"was focused on the Trust language to determine whether [Ms. Westling] had 
ultimate decision-making authority with respect to Trust matters." (R. 218; Add. B. 
at B081.) And, if the trial court's statement is correct that its decision didn't hinge on 
Ms. Westling's affidavit, then its decision had to hinge on its interpretation of the trust 
document. In effect, the only logical way that the trial court could reach its ultimate 
decision, without relying on Ms. Westling's affidavit, is to conclude that the Trust 
language required Ms. Westling's consent prior to her cotrustees commencing these legal 
proceedings. Or in other words, the Trust document would have to expressly require 
Ms. Westling's affirmative consent before any legal action could take place by a cotrustee 
that might be adverse to any other cotrustee. But the Trust document is void of any such 
language. See R. 74-87; Add. B. at B001-B014.) Therefore, the trial court erred in its 
interpretation of the Trust instrument. 
The trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion should be reviewed under a 
correction standard. In doing so, this Court should find that the trial court erred in 
denying the Rule 59 Motion since there is no language in the Trust document to support 
the ultimate conclusion reached by the trial court that Ms. Westling's authority as 
expressed in the Trust document was sufficient for her to dismiss this action. 
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III. The trial court erred by allowing Ms. Westling to intervene. 
A trial court must allow a party to intervene if that party can establish that (1) its 
motion to intervene is timely, (2) the party has an interest in the subject matter of the 
litigation, (3) the party's interest is or may be inadequately represented, and (4) the party 
is or may be bound by a judgment in the action. Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, If 13. 
In this case, Ms. Westling sought to intervene solely to protect her son, Mark, not the 
Trust for which she is also a cotrustee. Although Plaintiffs failed to cite in the trial court 
the statutory duty of a trustee, they did make the following statement in their argument 
opposing Ms. Westling's motion to intervene: "Ms. Westling would actually be working 
against her own self interest and certainly against the interest of the Trust while at the same 
time she has a duty to protect the Trust." See Pis' Mem. at 3 (R. 140.) That is. 
Ms. Westling has a statutory duty to administer the Trust solely in the interests of its 
beneficiaries and to do so with impartiality. §§ 75-7-802 and 803, U.CA; (Add. A. at 6.) 
It would be against public policy to allow Ms. Westling to intervene solely for the 
purpose of defeating her and her cotrustees' statutory duty to administer the Trust solely 
for the beneficiaries of the Trust and to do so with impartiality and not for the single or 
special desire to protect Ms. Westling's son, Mark. 
Further, the trial court did not articulate any specific findings pursuant to Rule 24(a), 
except to state that Ms. Westling "has satisfied the four part test as required by 
Rule 24(a), Utah R. Civ. P., as set forth in Chatteron v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 
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(Utah 1997). (R. 177; Add. B. at B035.) Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Westling failed to 
make any showing that her "interest is or may be inadequately represented" by her 
cotrustees, the Plaintiffs herein. 
If by "her interest" is meant her interest in protecting her son, Mark, then she may be 
correct that Plaintiffs would not withdraw their collection efforts against him. If, 
however, "her interest," as it lawfully should be, is to protect and administer the Trust by 
collecting on a debt owed to the Trust, then she was more than adequately protected by 
Plaintiffs. It appears that the trial court considered only Ms. Westling's desire to 
intervene to protect her son, Mark, and not whether Plaintiffs would adequately protect 
the Trust and her interest in the Trust. Moreover, there was no affidavit filed in support 
of Ms. Westling's motion to intervene because at the time she filed her motion, she had 
not yet signed her affidavit. 
Reviewing the sequence of filings provides a plausible explanation of how the trial 
court may have considered Ms. Westling's motion to intervene. The motion was filed on 
July 8,2009. (R. 63; Add. B. at B032.) Prior to the trial court's granting the motion, 
Ms. Westling filed on July 27, 2009 her motion to dismiss, along with her affidavit. 
(R. 109; Add. B. at B037.) On August 6, 2009, Ms. Westling filed a reply memorandum 
and her Request to Submit for Decision on the Motion to Intervene. (R. 151,155.) The 
trial court entered its ruling on the motion to intervene on August 18, 2009. (R. 177; 
Add. B. at B035.) Therefore, the trial court had before it Ms. Westling's affidavit and her 
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trial court didn't see or read or consider Ms. Westling's affidavit prior to granting her 
motion to intervene. It was squarely in the file when the Court reviewed the motion to 
intervene. Otherwise, there was no evidence in the record to support her claim that she 
was not adequately protected by Plaintiffs. 
This analysis is supported by a review of the single paragraph in Ms. Westling's 
memorandum in support of her motion to intervene: 
"Disposition of this action without [Ms. Westling's] participation, a real 
parties (sic) in interest, as an intervening party will utterly prevent 
[Ms. Westling] from protecting her present interest in the Trust property. 
As mentioned above, [Ms. Westling's] consent was not sought in filing 
this action. [Ms. Westling] does not consent to the expenditures of 
Trust assets in furtherance of this litigation and [Ms. Westling] 
possesses veto power with regard to all matters involving the 
administration of the Trust." 
(R. 70; Add. B. at B027.) 
First, there is no provision in the Trust language that requires Ms. Westling's 
consent. Second, there is no showing that Ms. Westling's interest in the Trust property 
will be harmed. To the contrary, if Plaintiffs are successful in recovering $47,000 from 
Mark, Ms. Westling's interest in the Trust property will be enhanced, not damaged. 
Third, Ms. Westling's consent before expending funds from the trust is not required and 
only her affidavit could validly raise this as an issue. Although her affidavit was not filed 
in support of her motion to intervene, it certainly was visible to the Court. 
Accordingly, this Court should find that the trial court erred in granting the motion to 
intervene. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants/Plaintiffs respectfully request that the district 
court's ruling dismissing this case be vacated and that this action be remanded for 
proceedings consistent with a motion for summary judgment. Further, Appellants 
respectfully request that the district court's ruling granting Ms. Westling's motion to 
intervene be vacated until she can provide more compelling reasons to intervene. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellants/Plaintiffs respectfully request oral argument because it will materially 
assist this Court in adjudicating the legal issues in this appeal. 
DATED this 4th day of March 2010 
Michael A. Jensen \^y 
Attorney for Appellants/Plaintiffs and 
Cotrustees Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman 
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ADDENDA 
This Addenda includes the following references and documents divided into two 
separate addenda as follows: 
Addendum A 
Key Legal Provisions 
Addendum B 
Pleadings, Motions, Memoranda, Minute Entries (signed) 
27 
ADDENDUM A 
ADDENDUM A 
Key Legal Provisions 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, 
(3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure 
to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be 
made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection 
is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a 
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such 
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the 
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party 
may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a 
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall 
be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a 
motion by Rule 56. 
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24 
(a) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to 
intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties. 
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3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to 
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following 
causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
4. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
5. Utah Code Ann., § 75-7-105 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, this chapter governs 
the duties and powers of a trustee, relations among trustees, and the rights and 
interests of a beneficiary. 
(2) Except as specifically provided in this chapter, the terms of a trust prevail 
over any provision of this chapter except: 
(a) the requirements for creating a trust; 
(b) the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the purposes 
of the trust; 
(c) the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of its beneficiaries; 
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6. Utah Code Ann., § 75-7-201 
(1) (a) The court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings initiated by interested 
parties concerning the internal affairs of trusts. 
(b) Proceedings which may be maintained under this section are those 
concerning: 
(i) the administration and distribution of trusts; 
(ii) the declaration of rights; and 
(iii) the determination of other matters involving trustees and 
beneficiaries of trusts. 
(c) These include, but are not limited to proceedings to: 
(i) appoint or remove a trustee; 
(ii) review a trustee's fees; 
(iii) review and settle interim or final accounts; 
(iv) ascertain beneficiaries; 
(v) determine any question arising in the administration or distribution 
of any trust, including questions of construction of trust instruments; 
(vi) instruct trustees; 
(vii) determine the existence or nonexistence of any immunity, power, 
privilege, duty, or right; and 
(viii) order transfer of administration of the trust to another state upon 
appropriate conditions as may be determined by the court or accept 
transfer of administration of a trust from another state to this state upon 
such conditions as may be imposed by the supervising court of the other 
state, unless the court in this state determines that these conditions are 
incompatible with its own rules and procedures. 
(2) (a) A proceeding under this section does not result in continuing supervision 
by the court over the administration of the trust. 
(b) The management and distribution of a trust estate, submission of accounts 
and reports to beneficiaries, payment of trustee's fees and other obligations of a 
trust, acceptance and change of trusteeship, and other aspects of the 
administration of a trust shall proceed expeditiously consistent with the terms of 
the trust, free of judicial intervention and without order, approval or other action 
of any court, subject to the jurisdiction of the court as invoked by interested 
parties or as otherwise exercised as provided by law. 
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Utah Code Ann- § 75-7-802 
(1) A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-803 
If a trust has two or more beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially in 
investing, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the 
beneficiaries1 respective interests. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-809 
A trustee shall take reasonable steps to enforce claims of the trust and to defend 
claims against the trust. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-810 
A trustee shall take reasonable steps to compel a former trustee or other person to 
deliver trust property to the trustee, and to redress a breach of trust known to the 
trustee to have been committed by a former trustee, unless the terms of the trust 
provide otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-814 
A trustee shall take reasonable steps to compel a former trustee or other person to 
deliver trust property to the trustee, and to redress a breach of trust known to the 
trustee to have been committed by a former trustee, unless the terms of the trust 
provide otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, 
not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs 
necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent 
with the rules of the Supreme Court. 
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(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the circuit 
court prior to July 1, 1996. 
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction over judgments and orders of the 
justice court as outlined in Section 78A-7-118 and small claims appeals filed 
pursuant to Section 78A-8-106. 
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district court 
are under Sections 78A-3-102 and 78A-4-103. 
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review: 
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63 G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that 
chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings; and 
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10-3-703.7. 
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter 
jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and 
violations of ordinances only if: 
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction; 
(b) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which the 
district courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed, or formed and 
then dissolved, a justice court; or 
(c) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single criminal 
episode alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor. 
(9) If the district court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (5) 
or (8), it also has jurisdiction over offenses listed in Section 78A-7-106 even if 
those offenses are committed by a person 16 years of age or older. 
(10) The district court has jurisdiction of actions under Title 78B, Chapter 7, 
Part 2, Child Protective Orders, if the juvenile court transfers the case to the 
district court. 
Addendum A Page 5 of 5 
ADDENDUM B 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ADDENDUM B 
1. The Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust B001-B014 
2. Complaint B015-B019 
3. Dorothy Westling's Motion, Memorandum in Support and 
Reply Memorandum to Intervene B020-B031 
4. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Intervene B032-B034 
5. Court's Minute Entry Granting Motion to Intervene B035-B036 
6. Dorothy Westling's Motion, Memorandum in Support and 
Reply Memorandum to Dismiss B037-B050 
7. Dorothy Westling's Affidavit, dated July 23, 2009 B051-B052 
8. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss B053-B057 
9. Court's Minute Entry Granting Motion to Dismiss B058-B060 
10. Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion, Memorandum in Support 
and Reply Memorandum in support B061-B072 
11. Dorothy Westling's Memorandum in Opposition to Rule 59 Motion . . . B073-B078 
12. Court's Minute Entry Denying the Rule 59 Motion B079-B081 
THE FREDERICK AND 
DOROTHY WESTLING 
FAMILY TRUST 
THIS TRUST AGREEMENT made and entered into at Salt Lake City, Utah this 
fc? day of August 1993, by and between FREDERICK GREEME WESTLING and 
DOROTHY E. WESTLING of Sandy, Utah, hereinafter called the "Grantors, and 
FREDERICK G. WESTLING, DOROTHY R WESTLING, JOY ANN W. 
GREENWOOD, ELLEN W. HARDMAN, and MARK WESTLING, Cotrustees, 
hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Co-trustees". 
W I T N E S S E T H 
WHEREAS, the Grantors desire by this Trust Agreement to establish a revocable 
trust upon the conditions and for the purposes and uses hereinafter set forth to make 
provision for the care and management of a certain Part of the Grantors* present property 
and for the ultimate distribution of the trust property and funds created hereby, 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises, agreements and undertakings 
of the parties hereto, the Grantors hereby assign, transfer, convey and deliver unto the Co-
trustees* the assets listed on Exhibit "A", to have and to hold the same in trust, to manage, 
invest and reinvest the same and an/addrtioiis that may from time to time be made thereto, 
subject to the hereinafter provided* Trust and terms conditions, powers and agreements 
relating thereto-
ARTICLE I 
GRANTORS' TRUST 
During the joint lifetimes of the Grantors, the Co-trustees shall pay to, or shall apply 
for, the Grantors' benefit, the net income of the Trust estate in quarter-annual or more 
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frequent installments. If the Co-Trustees consider the net income insufficient, they shall pay 
to, or apply for the benefit of the Grantors as much of the principal as is necessary in the 
Co-Trustees' discretion for the Grantors* proper health, education, support, maintenance, 
comfort and welfare, in accordance with their accustomed manner of living at the date of 
this instrument- The Co-Trustees shall exercise in a liberal manner the power to invade 
principal contained in this paragraph, and the rights of the Grantors' children shall be con-
sidered of secondary importance. 
ARTICLE II 
POWER OF INVASION 
The Grantors acting jointly may at any time direct the Co-Trustees in writing to pay 
single sums or periodic payments out of the Trust estate to any person or organization. 
ARTICLE III 
DEFINITION 
The first Grantor to die shall be called the "Deceased Spouse" and the surviving 
Grantor shall be caQed the "Surviving Spouse.* 
ARTICLE IV 
PAYMENTS ON DEATH OF FIRST SPOUSE 
On the death of the Deceased Spouse, the Co-Trustees shall pay out of the Trust 
estate all of the valid debts of the Deceased Spouse, the estate and inheritance taxes, 
including interest and penalties attributable to the trust estate, the last illness and funeral 
expenses of the Deceased Spouse, attorney's fees, and other costs incurred in administering 
the Deceased Spouse's estate. 
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ARTICLE V 
TRUST FOR SURVIVING SPOUSE 
After the death of the deceased spouse, the Co-trustees shall manage and distribute 
the assets of the Trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse as follows: 
(a) The Co-trustees shall pay to the Surviving Spouse, during his or her lifetime, all 
the income of the Trust, in monthly or other convenient installments, but in no event less 
frequently than annually, 
(b) In the event of emergency befalling the Surviving Spouse, such as illness, accident 
or other distress, Co-trustees are authorized to use and expend such part of the principal 
of the Trust as Cotrustees may deem necessary or desirable for medical, dental, hospital, 
nursing expenses and expenses of invalidism, 
(c) The Co-trustees shall permit the Surviving Spouse to use and enjoy all of the 
Deceased Spouse's interest in the family home during the Surviving Spouse's lifetime or so 
long as the Surviving Spouse desires and the Surviving Spouse shall not be required to pay 
any rent for the privilege of using the same. 
(d) Co-trustees are authorized with the written consent of a majority of the Grantors' 
then living children, to pay to the Surviving Spouse such portions of the principal of the 
Trust as the Co-trustees shall from time to time determine to be necessary in their absolute 
and uncontrolled discretion for his or her maintenance in health, support and reasonable 
comfort. 
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ARTICLE VI 
PAYMENTS ON THE DEATH OF SURVIVING SPOUSE 
On the death of the Surviving Spouse, the remaining Trustee shall pay out of the 
Trust estate all of the valid debts of the Surviving Spouse, the estate and inheritance taxes, 
if any, any and all doctor or hospital bills, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and any and all 
costs incurred in administering the Surviving Spouse's estate. 
ARTICLE VH 
JONATHAN KIP WESTUNG TRUST 
After the death of the Grantors, the Co-Trustees shall hold all of the Trust assets in 
the JONATHAN KIP WESTLING TRUST. The Co-Trustees shall hold, manage, invest 
and reinvest the trust assets subject to the hereinafter provided Trust and terms, conditions, 
powers and agreements relating thereto. 
SECTION t DISPOSITION OF PRINCIPAL AND INCOME 
(a) The Co-Trustees shall pay or apply for the benefit of JONATHAN KIP 
WESTLING during his lifetime such amounts from the principal or income, or both, of the 
Trust for the satisfaction of JONATHAN KIP WESlXING's special needs, as the Co-
Trustees in their sole discretion may from time to time deem reasonable or necessary subject 
to the limitations set out in this Trust Agreement. Any income of the Trust not distributed 
shall be added annually to the principal. 
(b) As used in this Trust Agreement, "special needs" refers to the requisites of 
maintaining JONATHAN KIP WESTLING's health, safety and welfare when, in the 
discretion of the Co-Trustees such needs are not being provided by any public or private 
agency, including any state, the United States, or any insurance carrier with insurance 
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policies covering JONATHAN KIP WESTLING. "Special needs" shall be limited to special 
equipment transportation, training programs, education, travel expenses, recreation, 
supplemental nursing care, dental care, unreimbursable medical expenses and items of 
comfort (but not of support) for JONATHAN KIP WESTLING subject to the limitations 
set forth in subparagraph (c) following. 
(c) The Co-Trustees are prohibited from expending any of the Trust principal or 
income for any property, services, benefits or medical care otherwise available to 
JONATHAN KIP WESTLING from any governmental source or from any insurance carrier 
required to cover JONATHAN KIP WESTLING. The Co-Trustees may pay any deductible 
amounts for JONATHAN KIP WESTLING on any insurance policies covering JONATHAN 
KIP WESTLING. The Co-Trustees shall cooperate with JONATHAN KIP WESTLING and 
his family to seek support and maintenance for JONATHAN KIP WESTLING from all 
available resources, including but not limited to, the Supplemental Social Security Income 
Program (SSI); the Old Age Survivor and Disability Insurance Program (OASDI); the 
Medicaid Program, and any additional, similar or successor programs; and from any private 
support sources. The Co-Trustees may supplement, but may not supplant, services, benefits 
and medical care avaflable to JONATHAN KIP WESTLING which is available through any 
governmental or private resource. 
SECTION II TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS 
(a) This is a Discretionary Non-Support Spendthrift Trust, None of the principal or 
ncome of the Trust Estate or any interest therein, shall be anticipated, assigned, or 
encumbered, or be subject to any creditors* claims or to any legal process. Furthermore, 
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because this Trust is to be conserved and maintained for the special needs of JONATHAN 
KIP WESTLING who may be physically or mentally disabled or unpaired during his lifetime, 
no part of the Trust Estate shall be construed as part of JONATHAN KIP WESTLING's 
estate, or be subject to the claims of voluntary or involuntary creditors of JONATHAN KIP 
WESTLING including any agency of the State of Utah, or any other state, or the United 
States. No part of the Trust Estate shall be liable to JONATHAN KIP WESTLING's 
creditors during his lifetime or after his death. 
(b) No part of the Trust assets shall be used to supplant or replace public assistance 
benefits of any county, state, or federal agency, to which JONATHAN KIP WESTLING is 
entitled by law. No part of the Trust shall be used to supplant or replace benefits due from 
any insurance carrier under any insurance policy covering JONATHAN KIP WESTLING. 
(c) All reasonable expenses in establishing, maintaining, administering, and defending 
this Trust, including but not limited to reasonable attorneys* fees, accounting fees, Co-
Trustee's fees, and costs shall be a proper charge to the Trust, 
(d) The validity of this Trust shall be determined by the laws of the State of Utah. 
(e) The Co-Trustees shall not be liable to JONATHAN KIP WESTLING or any 
other party for acts undertaken by the Co-Trustees in good faith. 
(f) Under no circumstances can JONATHAN KIP WESTLING compel a distribution 
from the Trust for any purpose. The Co-Trustees* discretion in making non-support 
disbursements is final as to all interested parties, even if the Co-Trustees elect to make no 
disbursements at alL Further, the Co-Trustees may be arbitrary and unreasonable. The Co-
Trustees' sole and independent judgment, rather than any other party's determination, is 
6 
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intended to be the criterion on which disbursements are made* No court or any other 
person should substitute its or their judgment for the decision or decisions made by the Co-
Trustees, 
SECTION IH TERMINATION OF TRUST 
In the event that the existence of this Trust has the effect of rendering either 
JONATHAN KIP WESTLING ineligible for any public benefit or any entitlement program, 
the Co-Trustees are authorized, but not required, to terminate this Trust, In the event of 
termination, the undistributed balance, principal and accrued and undistributed income, shall 
be distributed outright and free of Trust in equal shares to JOAN HELEN W. GROOM, 
JEAN W. SEAGER, MARK WECTUNG, JOY ANN W. GREENWOOD, ELLEN W. 
HARDMAN, and DAVID PETER WESTLING, and by right of representation to their 
issue in the evont they are deceased. 
SECTION IV. PAYMENTS AND DISTRIBUTIONS ON DEATH OF JONATHAN KIP 
WESTLING. 
Upon the death of JONATHAN KIP WESTLING, all remaining Trust assets shall 
be distributed by the Co-Trustees as provided in Article VHI. 
ARTICLE VIII 
WESTLING CHILDREN TRUSTS 
After the death of both of the Grantors and JONATHAN KIP WESTLING, the Co-
Trustees shall divide the Trust assets into six (6) equal shares: ONE (1) share for each of 
the foUowing children of the Grantors: JOAN HELEN WESTLING GROOM, JEAN 
WESTLING SEAGER, MARK WESTLING, JOY ANN WESTLING GREENWOOD, 
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ELLEN WESTLING HARDMAN, and DAVID PETER WESTLING. Thereafter, the Co-
Trustees shall distribute each share as follows: 
(1) If the Grantors' child is then alive, his or her share estate shall be distributed to 
him or her outright and free of trust 
(2) If any child is then deceased with issue surviving, the Co-Trustees shall hold the 
deceased child's share in trust until the youngest of such issue living at the death of the child 
attains the age of twenty-one (21) years or would have attained the age of twenty-one (21) 
years had he or she lived so long, at which time the Co-Trustees shall pay over the principal 
of the Trust in equal shares to the then living issue of the deceased child, per stirpes, and 
by right of representation. 
(a) Prior to the time that such deceased child's issue attains the age of twenty-
one (21) years, the Co-Trustees, in their sole discretion, may use so much or all of 
the Trust income and principal of the Trust as the Co-Trustees deem for the best 
interest of the deceased child's respective issue, for his or her health, maintenance, 
comfort, support, and education (including college, university, business, professional, 
or equivalent training), wedding expenses, and expenses while serving on a mission 
for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 
(3) If any child of the Grantors dies before receiving all of the principal of his or her 
respective trust without leaving issue surviving him or her, or in the event all of his or her 
issue shall die before final distribution of all of the assets of his or her separate trust, the 
principal of his or her trust shall be added to the trusts of the other children of the Grantors 
(counting as one such trust the trust held for the issue of another deceased child of the 
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Grantors), in equal proportions, to be held in trust if such trusts have not been distributed 
or to be distributed outright to the Grantors* other children if their trusts have been already 
distributed to them, or if the Grantors' other children have already received final distribution 
of their trust and are no longer living, to the issue of such other deceased child of the 
Grantors. 
ARTICLE IX 
SPENDTHRIFT TRUST 
No interest of any beneficiary in the Trusts created herein, nor any part of such 
interests, shall in any event be subject to sale, assignment, hypothecation or transfer by any 
beneficiary or subject to any judgment rendered against any beneficiary or subject to the 
process of any court in aid of execution of any judgment so rendered, and all of the income 
and/or principal under this Trust shall be transferable, payable and deliverable only to the 
beneficiaries designated hereunder at the time they are entitled to take the same under the 
terms of this Trust 
ARTICLE X 
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITY 
Anything to tbe^contraiy notwithstanding the trusts created herein shall terminate not 
later than twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last survivor of the Grantors, their 
chQdren and their grandchildren who are living at the death of the deceased spouse, and if 
any trust created herein has not sooner terminated, Co-trustees at said time shall pay over, 
convey, and deliver the remaining Trust assets then in their possession in equal shares to the 
persons then entitled to receive the income therefrom. 
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ARTICLE XI 
POWER OF GRANTORS 
(a) During the joint lifetimes of the Grantors, this Trust may be revoked in whole 
or in part by an instrument in writing signed by both Grantors and delivered by certified mail 
to the Co-Trustees- On revocation, the Co-Trustees shall promptly deliver to the Grantors 
all, or the designated portion, of the Trust assets. The Co-Trustees shall also account for 
their acts since the preceding account. If this instrument is revoked with respect to all major 
portions of the assets subject to the instrument, the Co-Trustees shall be entitled to retain 
sufficient assets reasonable to secure payment of liabilities lawfully incurred by the Co-
Trustees in the administration of the Trust, unless the Grantors shall indemnify the Co-
Trustees against loss or expense. 
(b) The Grantors may at any time during their joint lifetimes amend any of the terms 
of this instrument by an instrument in writing signed by both Grantors and delivered 
personally or by certified mail to the Co-Trustees* No amendment shall substantially 
increase the duties or liabilities of the Co-Trustees without the Co-Trustees' consent, nor 
shall the Co-Trustees be obligated to act under such an amendment unless the Co-Trustees 
accept iL If a Trustee is removed, the Grantors shall pay to the Trustee any sums due and 
shall indemnify the Trustee against liability lawfully incurred by the Trustee in the 
administration of the Trusts. 
(c) On the death of the Deceased Spouse, this Trust shall become irrevocable and 
the Suiviving Spouse shall not have the right or power to amend, revoke or terminate the 
Trust. 
10 
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ARTICLE XII 
INCOME 
Income accrued on property originally placed in or subsequently added to the Trust, 
at the time of its transfer to the Co-Trustees, and dividends on shares of stock originally 
placed in or subsequently added to the Trust which are declared prior to the date such 
shares are placed in or added to the Trust, but payable to stockholders of record determined 
as of the date which is on or subsequent to the date such shares are placed in or added to 
the Trust, shall be income of the Trust. Upon the termination of any estate, interest, or 
Trust hereunder, all income which has accrued on Trust assets, but which has not been 
received by said Co-Trustees and all dividends declared, but not yet received by said Co-
trustees, shall belong to the succeeding estate subject to any charges or advances against said 
income or dividends. 
ARTICLE Xin 
PAYMENT 
In any case in which the Co-Trustees are required, or desire to divide the principal 
of the Trust estate in parts or shares, they are authorized and empowered in their sole 
discretion to make division in kind, or partly in kind and partly in money- The judgment of 
the Co-Trustees concerning the values for the purposes of such division of the property or 
securities shall be binding and conclusive on all parties interested therein. 
ARTICLE XIV 
POWER OF CO-TRUSTEES 
(a) The G>Trustees shall have all of the rights and powers conferred upon them by 
Section 75-7-402 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
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(b) In the event the Co-Trustees are unable to agree on any matter in the 
administration of this Trust after the death of either FREDERICK GREEME WESTLING 
or DOROTHY E. WESTLING, the decision of the survivor of FREDERICK GREEME 
WESTLING or DOROTHY E. WESTLING shall govern so long as she or he is alive and 
competent. 
(c) Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, no powers 
enumerated herein or accorded to Co-Trustees generally pursuant to law shall be construed 
to enable the Grantors or the Co-Trustees or any other person to purchase, exchange or 
otherwise deal with or dispose of the principal or income of this Trust for less than an 
adequate or full consideration in money or money's worth, or to enable the Grantors or the 
Co-Trustees to borrow the income or principal of this Trust, directly or indirectly, without 
adequate interest or security. No person, other than the Co-Trustees, shall have or exercise 
the power to vote or direct the voting of any stock or other securities of this Trust, to control 
the investment of this Trust either by directing investment or reinvestments, or by vetoing 
proposed investments or reinvestments, or to reacquire or exchange any property of this 
Trust by substituting other property of an equivalent value, 
(d) It is the desire of the Grantors that the Co-Trustees consider and make 
investments in mumcipal bonds, mutual funds, and other areas which will return tax-free 
interest in order to minimize the income taxes and permit greater accumulation of assets 
within this Trust 
12 
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ARTICLE XV 
RECORDS 
The Co-Trustees shall keep true and correct books of account showing aU transactions 
in the Trust estate, which books of account shall at all reasonable times be open to the 
inspection of any beneficiary hereunder. Co-Trustees shall render annual statements of 
receipts and disbursements and any inventory showing the assets and property constituting 
the Trust estate to the beneficiaries of this Trust. 
ARTICLE XVI 
ADMINISTRATION 
(a) The Co-Trustees shall not be entitled to compensation for services rendered by 
them but shall be reimbursed for their out-of-pocket expenses. 
(b) Any Trustee may resign at any time upon giving thirty (30) days written notice 
to the beneficiaries then entitled to receive the income from the Trust estate. 
(c) In the event of resignation, removal inability, or refusal to act of all of the 
Trustees, a successor Trustee shall be selected by a vote of a majority of the Grantors' 
children, if the Grantors are deceased. Any successor Trustee selected shall have and may 
exercise all of the rights, powers, duties and discretion conferred or imposed upon the Co-
Trustees. Any successor Trustee appointed hereunder shall not be obligated to examine the 
accounts and actions of the previous Co-Trustees, and no successor Trustee shall be 
responsible in any way for any acts or omission of any previous Trustee. 
(d) In the event of the death, resignation, or incapacity of any of the Co-trustees, all 
rights and powers of the C6-Trustees shall thereupon vest in and be exercised by the 
remaining Co-Trustees. 
13 
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(e) If any interest in any part of the Grantors* estate or this Trust would vest in any 
person if he were alive upon the occurrence of any contingency (such as the Grantors' death 
or the attaining of a specified age), and if such person dies under circumstances where it 
would be difficult or impossible to determine whether he was alive upon the occurrence of 
such contingency, then for purposes of this Trust, such person shall be deemed to have died 
prior to the occurrence of such contingency. 
(f) Incapacity of the Grantor shall be established by a written statement signed by 
an unrelated physician and filed with the othe* Co-Trustees, 
J5 
ARTICLE XVH 
SEVERABILITY 
If any provision of this Agreement shall be unenforceable, the remaining provisions 
nevertheless shall be carried into effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantors have hereunto set their hands and the Co-
trustees have caused these presents to be executed as of the day and year first above-written. 
"GRANTORS" / , / ,„ "CO-TRUSTEES" / 
</>*&vn) 
Frederick Greeme Westling 
Dorothy E. Westling 
•^^Uj^CL^AJf^XS^T^ %. 
Frederick Greeme Westling 
Dorothy E. Westling / 
/PL hA w^&^A+^nrCsi 
W, Greenwood 
M W to, tj*«4. 
swiff./ir\, 
Ellen W. Hardxnan 
Mark Westling " 
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; mike@jJtahattorney.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE SALT LAKE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street 
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
In-Court Clerk: 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff, The Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust, by and through its 
counsel of record, Michael A. Jensen, hereby brings this action against the above-named 
Defendant and states and alleges as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff is a trust administered in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. Upon information and belief, Mark Westling is a resident of the State of Arizona. 
3. Defendant Mark Westling is also a Co-Trustee of Plaintiff. 
ass?^ 
COMPLAINT 
civil No. QCjoqcSL-]-] CN 
Judge fYicdle-K/ 
o 
4. Since the incident on which this action is based occurred in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, venue is proper in the Third Judicial District Court, pursuant to § 78-13-7, U.CA. 
5. The basis for this action lies in contract, fraud and negligence. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
6. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 
through 5 as though set forth verbatim herein. 
7. In the summer of 2007, Plaintiff, at Defendant's express request, loaned to 
Defendant the amount of $7,000, which amount was to be promptly repaid with interest. 
8. In addition, Plaintiff advanced to Defendant the amount of $40,000 for the 
purpose of purchasing a home for Defendant, his wife, and for Defendant's mother, 
Dorothy Westling, who is also a Co-Trustee of Plaintiff and its primary beneficiary. 
9. Plaintiff obtained the $40,000 and the $7,000 by way of a mortgage on property 
owned by Plaintiff, by and through its trustees. 
10. Defendant used the $40,000 to purchase a home but failed to include his mother 
as an owner on the title of the home or to make any other equitable provisions for her. 
11. Further, Defendant failed to make timely payments on the home and the home 
was taken in a foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure; at any rate, the entire $40,000 
has been lost and Plaintiff is now responsible for repaying $40,000 by way of the 
mortgage it took on Plaintiffs property. 
- 2 -
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12. As a result of Defendant's failure to repay the $7,000, Plaintiff is damaged by 
that amount plus accrued interest. 
13. Further, as a result of Defendant's failure to make timely payments on his own 
mortgage and secure the $40,000 equity provided by Plaintiff, Plaintiff is damaged by that 
amount plus accrued interest. 
14. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to damages for its losses in the amount of $40,000 
plus $7,000 and plus interest as provided by law. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Fraud) 
15. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 
through 14 as though set forth verbatim herein. 
16. During the negotiations for the advancement of the $40,000 to purchase a home, 
Defendant represented to Plaintiff that he had the financial means to sustain a mortgage 
and thereby protect the $40,000 in equity in the home that was to be purchased. 
17. Plaintiff relied on Defendant's representations that he could and would protect 
the $40,000 advancement and equity in the home where he and his mother would reside. 
18. Had Plaintiff known that Defendant's financial condition and stability was so 
fragile, it would have never advanced those funds to Defendant. 
19. Defendant knew or should have known of his fragile financial condition at the 
time he took the $40,000, but he intentionally or negligently failed to advise Plaintiff so 
that Plaintiff could make an informed decision about advancing those funds to him. 
- 3 -
20. As a result of Defendant's failure to inform Plaintiff of his precarious financial 
condition, Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of $40,000 plus accrued interest that 
it has been paying on the mortgage taken out by Plaintiff to obtain the $40,000 for 
Defendant. 
21. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of $40,000 plus 
accrued interest paid or owed on the mortgage Plaintiff initiated to obtain the necessary 
$40,000 to advance to Defendant or in the alternative plus interest as allowed by law. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
22. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 
through 21 as though set forth verbatim herein. 
23. Plaintiff acted in good faith with Defendant in arranging for a mortgage on 
Plaintiffs property to make available to Defendant the $40,000 that was intended to 
provide housing for Defendant's mother and who is the primary beneficiary of Plaintiff s 
property. 
24. Defendant had a duty to inform his Co-Trustees and Plaintiff that he was failing 
to make timely payments on the mortgage that he took out using the $40,000 as initial 
equity. 
25. By failing to inform Plaintiff of his financial predicament, Plaintiff had no 
opportunity to cure Defendant's default and thereby save the $40,000 in equity in 
Defendant's home. 
- 4 -
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26. As a result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount 
of $40,000 plus accrued interest that it has been paying on the mortgage taken out by it to 
obtain the $40,000 for Defendant. 
27. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of $40,000 plus 
accrued interest paid or owed on the mortgage Plaintiff initiated to obtain the necessary 
$40,000 to advance to Defendant or in the alternative plus interest as allowed by law. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the above-entitled Court for judgment as follows: 
Based on the First Cause of Action: 
That an order and judgment be entered against Defendant in the amount of 
$47,000, plus interest, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees as allowed by law. 
Based on the Second and Third Causes of Action: 
That an order and judgment be entered against Defendant in the amount of 
$47,000, plus interest, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees as allowed by law and 
punitive damages as allowed by law. 
Dated this 7th day of April 2009. 
v^^^jk^— 
Michael A. Jensen Q / 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs address: 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City UT 84157-1708 
- 5 -
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KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
DOROTHY WESTLING'S MOTION TO 
INTERVENE 
Case No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Dorothy Westling, as Grantor, 
Co-Trustee, and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust 
(the "Trust"), by and through counsel, hereby respectfully moves the Court to permit her to 
intervene as of right pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) in the above-referenced 
action filed by Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman purportedly on behalf of the Trust. 
Rule 24(a)(2) states that, "upon a timely motion, a party shall be permitted to 
intervene...(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which 
is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 
18254.001/4835-6143-7699.1 
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practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest 
is adequately represented by existing parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
Dorothy Westling's ("Dorothy") motion is timely because it was filed before any 
discover or any other action has been taken in this case. Dorothy should be permitted to 
intervene as of right because Dorothy is the Grantor, Co-Trustee with veto power over matters 
related to the administration of the Trust, and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Trust. Dorothy 
did not consent to the filing of the complaint initiating this action and does not consent to 
expending Trust assets in furtherance of the claims asserted, purportedly on behalf of the Trust, 
because she deems such claims to lack merit. The only manner in which Dorothy can protect her 
interest in the Trust assets is by allowing her to intervene in this matter. 
Dorothy should be permitted to intervene in the above-referenced action for the limited 
purpose of bringing to the Court's attention that Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman lack the 
requisite authority to initiate litigation on behalf of the Trust. 
DATED this %_ day of July, 2009 
K^NTB. ALDERMAN 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
18254 001/4835-6143-7699 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this £iL day of July, 2009, I caused to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, and E-mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Intervene, to: 
Michael A. Jensen 
mike@utahattorney.com 
136 So. Main Street, Suite 430 
P.O. Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-0708 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Elizabeth S. Conley 
e_conley@comcast.net 
3604 Astro Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Attorney for Mark Westling 
k£ 
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KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
DOROTHY WESTLING'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO INTERVENE 
Case No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utak Rules of Civil Procedure, Dorothy Westling, as Grantor, 
Co-Trustee, and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust 
(the "Trust"), by and through counsel, respectfully submit this Memorandum in Support of her 
Motion to Intervene in the above-referenced action for the limited purpose of notifying the 
Court of and remedying Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman's ultra-vires act of initiating this 
litigation on behalf of the Trust, when they lack authority to do so under the plain terms of the 
Trust. 
18254.001/4836-4578-2531.1 
f I ' . C D 
OS J U L - 3 PH 3 ^ 5 9 
FACTS 
Dorothy Westling ("Dorothy") is the Grantor, a Co-Trustee and the sole Qualified 
Beneficiary1 of the Trust. On April 7,2009, Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman filed this action 
against Mark Westling purportedly on behalf of the Trust. Mark Westling was served with a 
copy of the complaint on April 16,2009. There are four trustees of the Trust: (1) Mark 
Westling; (2) Dorothy Westling; (3) Joy Greenwood; and (4) Ellen Hardman (collectively, the 
"Co-Trustees"). Article XIV of the Trust provides: 
In the event the Co-Trustees are unable to agree on any matter in 
the administration of this Trust after the death of either 
FREDERICK GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. 
WESTLING, the decision of the survivor of FREDERICK 
GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. WESTLING shall 
govern so long as she or he is alive and competent. 
Trust at Article XVI(b), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
Neither Joy Greenwood nor Ellen Hardman sought Dorothy's consent before initiating 
this litigation. Dorothy does not agree with pursuing this litigation against Mark Westling 
because each of the Co-Trustees agreed to and ratified the transactions complained of in the 
complaint, therefore Dorothy deems this litigation to be meritless and a waste of Trust assets. 
Therefore, Dorothy feels compelled to intervene in this action to prevent the dissipation of Trust 
assets. 
1
 Qualified Beneficiary is defined in the Utah Uniform Trust Code as "a beneficiary who, on the date the 
beneficiary's qualification is determined: 
(i) is a current distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal; or 
(ii) would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the trust terminated on that 
date". 
18254.001/4836-4578-2531.1 
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ARGUMENT 
L DOROTHY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO INTERVENE AS O F RIGHT 
Rule 24(a)(2) states that, "upon a timely motion, a party shall be permitted to intervene 
.. .or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is 
adequately represented by existing parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
Courts apply Rule 24(a) as a four-part test, and find a right to intervene where: (1) the 
application is timely, (2) the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action, (3) the applicant's interest may as a practical matter be 
impaired or impeded by the action* and (4) the applicant's interest is not adequately represented 
by existing parties. Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001); 
Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255, 258-59 (Utah 1997). Courts are liberal in allowing 
intervention. See, e.g., Utah Ass'n of Counties, 255 F.3d at 1249; Chatterton, 938 P.2d at 258. 
As demonstrated hereafter each of, the elements for intervention of right are easily 
satisfied by Dorothy 
A. DOROTHY'S MOTION IS TIMELY 
Dorothy's Motion to Intervene ("Motion") is undeniably timely. See Utah Ass'n of 
Counties, 255 F.3d at 1250-1251 (noting that the timeliness inquiry is primarily concerned with 
preventing prejudice to the original parties). No significant action has been taken with regard to 
this litigation. In fact Dorothy seeks to intervene in this litigation to terminate this litigation as 
18254.001/4836-4578-2531.1 
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Co-Trustees Ellen Hardman and Joy Greenwood lack authority without Dorothy's consent to file 
an action in the name of the Trust 
B. DOROTHY HAS A DIRECT INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE, 
IN FACT DOROTHY, AS THE SOLE QUALIFIED BENEFICIARY IS THE REAL PARTY 
IN INTEREST IN THIS CASE. 
One seeking to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) must have a direct interest in the 
property or transaction that is the subject of the lawsuit. This requirement is not a stringent one: 
'the interest test is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many 
apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process." Utah Ass 'n of 
Counties, 255 F.3d at 1251-52. Thus, so long as there is no threat to efficiency or due process, 
courts are inclined to involve any party who is "apparently concerned" with the subject of the 
action. 
As applied to the matter before the Court, Dorothy is more than merely concerned in the 
subject of this action, but rather is the real party in interest. Dorothy is the Grantor, the Co-
Trustee with final decision making authority, and the sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Trust. If 
Dorothy is not permitted to intervene in this case, Trust assets will be dissipated through this 
litigation and she will have no ability to prevent Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman from 
expending Trust assets in furtherance of this litigation. 
C. DOROTHY'S INTEREST WILL BE IMPAIRED BY THIS ACTION IF DOROTHY IS NOT 
PERMITTED TO INTERVENE 
A party seeking to intervene must also show that its "interest may as a practical matter be 
impaired or impeded by the action." Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). To satisfy this requirement, the 
intervenor applicant need only show that impairment of its interest is possible. Utah Ass *n of 
QSfMb^M^1253' "This burden is minimal." Id 
4 
Disposition of this action without Dorothy's participation, a real parties in interest, as an 
intervening party will utterly prevent Dorothy from protecting her present interest in Trust 
property. As mentioned above, Dorothy's consent was not sought in filing this action. Dorothy 
does not consent to the expenditure of Trust assets in furtherance of this litigation and Dorothy 
possesses veto power with regard to all matters involving the administration of the Trust. 
D. JOY GREENWOOD AND ELLEN HARDMAN, THE PARTIES WHO FILED THIS 
ACTION PURPORTEDLY ON BEHALF OF THE TRUST, CANNOT ADEQUATELY 
REPRESENT DOROTHY'S INTERESTS 
Finally, Rule 24(a)(2) requires intervenor applicants to show that the parties presently in 
the lawsuit do not adequately represent their interests. Again, this burden is "minimal," 
requiring the would-be-intervenor only to show that "representation may be inadequate." Utah 
Ass'n of Counties, 255 F.3d at 1254 (emphasis added). 
Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman filed this action purportedly on behalf of the Trust. 
In the event that the Co-Trustee cannot reach a unanimous agreement with regard to any matter 
involving the administration of the Trust, Dorothy's decision governs. Dorothy disagrees with 
and does not consent to Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman filing this action on behalf of the 
Trust. Therefore, Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman have already disregarded Dorothy's 
interest in this matter and they cannot represent Dorothy's interest. Further, Joy Greenwood and 
Ellen Hardman are adverse to Dorothy's interests as they have filed a separate action seeking to 
remove Dorothy as a Co-Trustee. 
18254.001/4836-4578-2531.1 
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CONCLUSION 
Rule 24(a) is mandatory rather than permissive and therefore, for the reasons stated 
above, the Court should permit Dorothy to intervene in this case for the limited purpose of 
bringing Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman's ultra-vires act of filing this suit to the Court's 
attention. 
DATED this J l day of July, 2009 
KENT B. ALDERMAN 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
18254 001/4836-4578-2531.1 
KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
DOROTHY WESTLING'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO INTERVENE 
Case No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rules 7 and 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Dorothy Westling 
("Dorothy"), as Grantor, Co-Trustee with final decision making authority, and sole Qualified 
Beneficiary of the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust (the "Trust"), by and through 
counsel, respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of her Motion to Intervene in 
the above-referenced action. 
F I L E D n r T 
DISTRICT COURT 
09 AUG - f PH 6: ! I 
HiRD Wkhwu^ 
o y '- - ' ' --' "• ^ 
DEPUTY CUR* 
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ARGUMENT 
In opposition to Dorothy's Motion to Intervene Petitioners Joy Greenwood and Ellen 
Hardman ("Petitioners") assert, without citing a single authority, that: (1) Dorothy has no interest 
in this matter; and (2) Dorothy's interests are adequately protected by Petitioners in this case. 
Each of these unsubstantiated arguments is void of merit. 
First, it is undisputed that Dorothy is the grantor of the Trust, the Trust was funded with 
her property, she is the sole beneficiary with a present interest in the Trust and she, as grantor of 
the Trust reserved to herself ultimate decision making authority over the administration of the 
Trust.1 These indisputable facts conclusively establish that Dorothy has an interest in the 
property and transactions which are subject to this case. Clearly, if Dorothy does not have an 
interest in this matter no one does. 
Second, Petitioners assert that Dorothy's interests are adequately protected by Petitioners 
and inexplicably argue that Dorothy, who does not desire this litigation to continue, is attempting 
to escalate legal costs. It is irrefutable that Dorothy's interests are not adequately represented in 
this case. It is clear that Petitioners desire to expend thousands of dollars of Trust funds to 
pursue a debt of a mere $7,000, which the debtor, Mark Westling, fully acknowledges he is 
1
 Article XIV of the Trust provides: 
In the event the Co-Trustees are unable to agree on any matter in 
the administration of this Trust after the death of either 
FREDERICK GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. 
WESTLING, the decision of the survivor of FREDERICK 
GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. WESTLING shall 
govern so long as she or he is alive and competent. 
4830-4713-2420.1 
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obligated to repay. Further, in a separate action, Petitioners are attempting to remove Dorothy as 
a Co-Trustee of her own Trust. 
In the end Petitioners refuse to acknowledge what is plainly clear from the plain language 
of the Trust, that Dorothy reserved to herself ultimate decision making authority over the Trust. 
Petitioners simply refuse to accept this reality, but instead continue to pursue meritless litigation 
at the expense of the Trust. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts are liberal in allowing intervention. See, e.g., Utah Ass 'n of Counties, 255 F.3d at 
1249; Chatterton, 938 P.2d at 258. In this case it is clear that Dorothy has a sufficient interest in 
the Trust as to be entitled to intervene in this matter as of right. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 2009 
KENT B. ALDERMAN 
MATTHEW D.COOK 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
4830-4713-2420.1 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) ^ ^ C ^ C Q ^ 1 
Attorney at Law ° * ^ 3 
PO BOX 571708 0 9 ^ L ^ 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-1708 -AC\C\^ 0{«JTV° 
(801) 519-9040; mike@.utahattoml#Mrit U * E c 0 
Served on 07/27/2009 
Counsel for Co-Trustees Hardman andGreem!^&^^y\ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City UT 84111 -1860 
In-Court Clerk: 238-7503/7504 (Tina/Tamara) W48 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
V 
• 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO INTERVENE 
Civil No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, by and through counsel, 
hereby submits its memorandum in opposition to the Motion to Intervene filed by 
Dorothy Westling and requests the Court to deny the Motion. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiff, being the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust ("Trust"), filed 
its Complaint against Mark Westling on April 7, 2009; Mr. Westling was served on 
April 16, 2009 in Arizona. 
2. An Answer was filed on May 13, 2009. 
3. On May 19, 2009, Defendant filed a Motion to Consolidate this case with 
Case No. 093900329, a probate case filed for the purpose of removing Mark Westling 
and Dorothy Westling as Co-Trustees of The Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family 
Trust ("Trust"), a Trust that is now irrevocable. 
4. The Motion to Consolidate was denied by Judge Trease. 
5. Dorothy Westling is currently the subject of a challenge to her cognitive abilities 
to know and understand any aspects of the Trust's administration which has been and is 
exclusively administered by the two Co-Trustees who initiated this action on behalf of the 
Trust. 
6. If Ms. Westling is removed as a Co-Trustee as anticipated, she will have no say 
nor any control over the administration of the Trust, and this will be consistent with her 
prior lack of involvement in the administration of the Trust. 
7. The purpose of this action is to recover for the benefit of the Trust the debt owed 
to the Trust by Defendant, Mark Westling, who also is a Co-Trustee. 
ARGUMENT 
As correctly cited by Ms. Westling, she must meet a four-part test: (1) her application 
must be timely; (2) she must claim an interest relating to the property or transaction which is 
the subject of the action; (3) she must be impaired or impeded by the action if she isn't 
allowed to intervene; and (4) her interest must not be adequately represented by existing 
parties. Ms. Westling fails to meet parts 2, 3 and 4. 
Ms. Westling is a beneficiary of the Trust, but she has no personal claim to the debt 
owed to the Trust by Defendant. And even if she had such an interest in the debt, her 
interest will not be impaired by not intervening. That is, will Ms. Westling act in the role of 
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Plaintiff and aggressively pursue the collection of the debt for the Trust? To the contrary, 
Ms. Westling desires to intervene solely to defeat the collection of the debt. Thus, 
Ms. Westling desires to rob the Trust of its right and opportunity to enhance and benefit the 
Trust. Therefore, Ms. Westling will not be impaired by the Court's denial of her request to 
intervene. 
Most important is Ms. Westling's failure to meet the fourth part of the tost Plaintiff is 
aggressively pursuing the collection of a debt owed to it. Ms. Westling is more than 
adequately represented in this action, and she has not offered any evidence that her interest 
is not adequately represented. In fact, if Ms. Westling were allowed to intervene, she would 
take the side of Defendant to defeat the Trust's claim to collect the debt owed to it. Thus, 
Ms. Westling would actually be working against her own self interest and certainly against 
the interest of the Trust while at the same time she has a duty to protect the Trust. 
It is also disingenuous for Ms. Westling to seek the conservation of legal fees to be 
paid by the Trust. She is the one who has escalated this action way out of proportion by 
fighting to protect Defendant so that he won't have to pay his debt to the Trust. Instead, 
Ms. Westling should simply request her son to pay the Trust the amount that he owes. 
Based on Ms. Westling's failure to meet all four tests for a Rule 24 intervention, the 
Court should deny the motion. 
DATED this 27th day of July 2009. 
Michael A. Jensen (^  ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
: MINUTE ENTRY DECISION AND ORDER 
: CASE NO. 090905677 
Dorothy Westling1 s Motion to Intervene is submitted to the Court for 
decision pursuant to Rule 7(d), Utah R. Civ. P. Having reviewed and 
considered all Memoranda in support, opposition and reply, the Court 
rules as follows: 
1 Dorothy Westling!s Motion to Intervene is granted in full as 
prayed for. The Court finds that Dorothy Westling has satisfied the four 
part test as required by Rule 24(a), Utah R. Crv. P., as set forth in-
Chattertoii v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997), 
2 This signed Minute Entry Decision shall constitute the Order 
of the Court resolving the matter referenced herein, no further Order is 
required. 
Dated this (0 day of August, 2009 
TYR< 
DIS 
E. MEDLEY 
CT COURT JUDG; 
WESTLING TRUST V. WESTLING PAGE 2 Kli^UTh A 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
1 herd ': 'ertify r hat I mailed a true and correct copy of th« 
foregoing Minute Entry Decision anr! Ordt - tc the following, thir, L ^ 
i.-r *.f Augusi ,:CG° / ' - . . 
-Michaei H. uensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 S. Main Street Su 
I' Box 571708 
Sa: Lake Cir\. Utah 84157-1708 
Elizabeth S. Conley 
a*-*-^ rr:-y for Defendant Mark West]ing 
Jt>u4 Astro Circle 
Salt Lake Ci» . *'t -.!• . 4109-3843 
Kent B» Alderman ; / 
Matthew D."Cook 
Attorneys-for Doroth; Westling 
20i is. Main Street, Sw . i , H-t 
Salt- Lake Cil-v Utah 8- "i . I 
KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
DOROTHY WESTLING'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR LACK OF STANDING 
Case No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Dorothy Westling, as Grantor, 
a Co-Trustee, and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family 
Trust (the "Trust"), by and through counsel, moves to dismiss the above-referenced action for 
lack of standing. Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman lack standing to initiate or maintain this 
litigation in the name of the Trust. As set forth more fully in the Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing, Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman failed to invoke the 
jurisdiction of this Court because they lack sufficient authority to bring an action in the name of 
the Trust and therefore lack standing. 
18254 001/4838-4743-6803 1 
This motion is further based on the accompanying memorandum in support hereof and on 
all of the pleadings, papers and records on file in this action. 
DATED thisffi day of July, 2009 
KEN<TB. ALDERMAN 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
18254.001/4838-4743-6803.1 
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KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
DOROTHY WESTLING'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
STANDING 
Case No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Dorothy Westling, as Grantor, 
a Co-Trustee, and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family 
Trust (the "111180, by and through counsel, respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support 
of her Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing in the above-referenced action. 
18254 001/4813-3085-4403 1 
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FACTS 
Dorothy Westling ("Dorothy") is the Grantor, a Co-Trustee and the sole Qualified 
Beneficiary1 of the Trust. On April 7, 2009, Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman filed this action 
against Mark Westling purportedly on behalf of the Trust. Mark Westling was served with a 
copy of the complaint on April 16, 2009. There are four trustees of the Trust: (1) Mark 
Westling; (2) Dorothy Westling; (3) Joy Greenwood; and (4) Ellen Hardman (collectively the 
"Co-Trustees"). Article XIV of the Trust provides: 
In the event the Co-Trustees are unable to agree on any matter in 
the administration of this Trust after the death of either 
FREDERICK GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. 
WESTLING, the decision of the survivor of FREDERICK 
GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. WESTLING shall 
govern so long as she or he is alive and competent. 
Trust at Article XVI(b), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A". 
Neither Joy Greenwood nor Ellen Hardman sought Dorothy's consent before initiating 
this litigation. See Aff. of D. Westling at f2, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
Because Dorothy's decision governs the administration of the Trust and Dorothy has not 
consented to nor does she consent to this litigation, Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman lack 
standing to bring this litigation in the name of the Trust. Stated simply, Dorothy does not agree 
with pursuing this litigation against Mark Westling because each of the Co-Trustees agreed to 
1
 Qualified Beneficiary is defined in the Utah Uniform Trust Code as "a beneficiary who, on the date the 
beneficiary's qualification is determined: 
(i) is a current distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal; or 
(ii) would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the trust terminated on that 
date." 
2 
and ratified the transactions complained of in the complaint, therefore Dorothy deems this 
litigation to be meritless and a waste of Trust assets. Id. at 3. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"[T]he question of whether a given individual . . . has standing to request a particular 
[form of] relief is primarily a question of law...." Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. 
v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, % 18, 82 P.3d 1125 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Generally, "for purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in 
the complaint are to be considered as true, with any inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiffs' 
claims." Haymondv. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27, ] 5, 89 P.3d 171. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ELLEN HARDMAN AND JOY GREENWOOD LACK STANDING To INITIATE LITIGATION 
ON BEHALF OF THE TRUST. 
Under Utah law, a plaintiff "must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court." 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). A Trust can only act through its trustees and 
in this case the Co-Trustees have not authorized bringing this litigation on behalf of the Trust. 
As mentioned above, Article XVI(b) of the Trust provides Dorothy with veto power over 
any action involving the administration of the Trust Dorothy has not consented to this action, 
therefore Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman lack authority and standing to bring an action in 
the name of the Trust. 
The Utah Uniform Trust Code, as well as the Trust, grants trustees, among other powers, 
the power to, "pay or contest any claim, settle a claim by or against the trust, and release, in 
3 
whole or in part, a claim belonging to the trust." Utah Code Ann. §75-7-814(n). The 
commentary to the Uniform Trust Code clarifies that: 
It may not be reasonable to enforce a claim depending upon the 
likelihood of recovery and the cost of suit and enforcement. It 
might also be reasonable to settle an action or suffer a default 
rather than to defend an action. See also Section 816(14) (power to 
pay, contest, settle, or release claims). 
Commentary to §811 of the Uniform Trust Code. 
Further, a trustee may release a claim or choose not to pursue a claim not only when it is 
uncollectible, but also when collection would be uneconomic. See Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts Section 192 (1959) (power to compromise, arbitrate and abandon claims). 
It appears clear that the decision of whether to maintain an action on behalf of a trust, 
which necessarily involves the economic decision of balancing the expenditure of Trust assets 
against the likelihood of recovery, involves and directly implicates the administration of a Trust. 
As applied to this case, Dorothy has analyzed the costs of maintaining an action against 
Mark Westling, the likelihood of succeeding on such claim and the likelihood of being able to 
collect on any potential judgment. Aff. of D. Westling at f4. Dorothy has decided that the costs 
greatly outweigh any benefits to the Trust in maintaining this litigation and therefore has not and 
does not agree with maintaining this litigation. Id Because Dorothy possesses veto power with 
respect to any matters, including whether to pursue claims on behalf ot the Trust, Joy 
Greenwood and Ellen Hardman lack standing to bring this action in the name of the Trust. 
Therefore, Dorothy respectfully requests that this Court dismiss this case because this Court 
4 
lacks jurisdiction. Absent Dorothy's approval Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman lack of 
standing to assert claims in the name of the Trust. 
Further, because Ellen Hardman and Joy Greenwood lack authority to bring this action in 
the name of the Trust, Dorothy requests that they be required to restore any and all Trust assets 
expended in connection with this unauthorized action to the Trust. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman's actions in initiating 
and maintaining this action against Mark Westling in the name of the Trust constitutes an ultra-
vires act because, without Dorothy's approval and consent, they lack the authority to maintain 
litigation in the name of the Trust. Because they lack the requisite authority, this Court does not 
have jurisdiction over this action because Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman lacked standing to 
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court in the name of the Trust. Joy Greenwood and Ellen 
Hardman should also be required to restore any and all Trust assets expended in fiirtherance of 
their ultra-vires act to the Trust such that the Trust be restored to the position it would have been 
in had they not maintained this action without the requisite authority. 
DATED t h i s ^ 1 day of July, 2009 
KEN-FB. ALDERMAN 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
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KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
THE FREDERICK AND DORO J1I'l 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
DOROTHY WESTLING'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rule 7 and Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Dorothy 
Westling ("Dorothy"), as co-grantor, co-trustee with final decision making authority and sole 
Qualified Beneficiary of the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust (the "Trust"), by and 
through her attorneys, hereby submits the following Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss. 
INTRODUCTION 
The basis for Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss is simple, Plaintiffs Joy Greenwood and Ellen 
Hardman (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed the above styled action in the name of the Trust and 
film DfSTftfCT CO0BT 
Hlird Judicial District 
AUG | if 2009 
SALT IKK£ COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
4823-0054-9636.1 169 
purportedly on behalf of the Trust, but Plaintiffs lack authority and therefore standing to 
maintain an action in the name of the Trust. 
Plaintiffs advance three arguments as to why the Motion to Dismiss should be denied: (1) 
Dorothy lacks standing to bring the Motion to Dismiss because her Motion to Intervene has yet 
been adjudicated; (2) the terms of the Trust do not govern whether Dorothy has ultimate decision 
making authority, but rather the Utah Code does; and (3) the issue of whether Dorothy analyzed 
the costs of maintaining this action is an issue of fact. Stated simply and as conclusively 
demonstrated below, each of Plaintiffs' arguments lacks merit. 
First, while it is true that Dorothy's Motion to Intervene has not yet been adjudicated, it 
has been submitted to this Court for decision. This Court is capable of ruling on Dorothy's 
Motion to Intervene prior to adjudicating Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss. A denial of Dorothy's 
Motion to Dismiss for the reasons asserted Plaintiffs would simply waste scarce judicial 
resources. 
Second, Plaintiff's argument that the provisions of the Utah Trust Code supersede the 
plain language of the Trust is simply wrong. Utah Code Ann. §75-7-105 clearly and 
unambiguously provides: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, this 
chapter governs the duties and powers of a trustee, relations among 
trustees, and the rights and interests of a beneficiary. 
(2) Except as specifically provided in this chapter, the terms of 
a trust prevail over any provision of this chapter... 
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-105(1) &(2) (emphasis added). 
4823-0054-9636.1 2 
The Trust clearly and unambiguously provides: 
In the event the Co-Trustees are unable to agree on any matter 
in the administration of this Trust after the death of either 
FREDERICK GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. 
WESTLING, the decision of the survivor of FREDERICK 
GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. WESTLING shall 
govern so long as she or he is alive and competent. 
Trust at Article XVI(b) (emphasis added) 
Despite Plaintiffs attempts to mislead this Court by stating, "However Ms. Westling fails 
to cite to any provision of the Trust agreement that requires Ms. Westling's consent Plaintiffs 
Opp. To Mot. to Dismiss at 3, Dorothy indeed cited the above quoted provision of the Trust in 
her initial memorandum, which provision grants Dorothy ultimate decision making authority 
regarding the administration of the Trust. Plaintiffs simply have no argument, nor does one 
exist, that the above quoted provision of the Trust does not governs. Instead Plaintiffs misstate 
Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss, ignore controlling provisions of the Trust and Utah law. 
Third, the issue before the Court is simple, do Plaintiffs have standing to bring an action 
in the name of the Trust. Plaintiffs try to confuse the sole issue raised by Dorothy's Motion to 
Dismiss by arguing that Dorothy's decision making process in deciding not to agree to this 
fruitless action is somehow relevant to whether Plaintiffs have standing in this case. Indeed, in 
accordance with the plain language of the Trust, Dorothy's decision regarding any matter related 
to the administration of the Trust shall govern regardless of the process she employed to arrive at 
such decision. 
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In sum, Plaintiff's ignore plain statements made in Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss, misstate 
Utah law and advance irrelevant arguments in an effort to defeat Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss. 
To no avail, if Plaintiffs do not currently have standing to maintain an action in the name of the 
Trust, this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs claims and "When we lack 
jurisdiction, we retain only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. 
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING IN THIS ACTION, THEREFORE THIS 
COURT RETAINS ONLY THE JURISDICTION TO DISMISS, 
Despite Plaintiffs meritless arguments, their refusal to recognize citations to the Trust 
contained in Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss, misstatements of Utah law and advancement of 
irrelevant arguments, Plaintiffs lack the authority and therefore the standing to maintain an action 
in the name of the Trust. Indeed, under Utah law a plaintiff, "must have standing to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court:'Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983), A plaintiff cannot 
merely hope to obtain standing at some date subsequent to the filing of his/her complaint. In 
order for Plaintiffs to have standing to bring this action in the name of the Trust, Plaintiffs must 
have Dorothy's consent and approval prior to bringing this action. 
First, despite Plaintiffs arguments that "Ms. Westling fails to cite to any provision of the 
Trust agreement that requires Ms. Westling's consent" Plaintiffs Opp. To Mot. to Dismiss at 3, 
the Trust is clear that Dorothy possesses ultimate decision making power with respect to the 
administration of the Trust. Specifically, the Trust provides: 
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In the event the Co-Trustees are unable to agree on any matter 
in the administration of this Trust after the death of either 
FREDERICK GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. 
WESTLING, the decision of the survivor of FREDERICK 
GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. WESTLING shall 
govern so long as she or he is alive and competent 
Trust at Article XVI(b) (emphasis added) 
Further, Utah Code Ann. §75-7-105 clearly and unambiguously provides: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, this 
chapter governs the duties and powers of a trustee, relations among 
trustees, and the rights and interests of a beneficiary. 
(2) Except as specifically provided in this chapter, the terms of 
a trust prevail over any provision of this chapter,.. 
Utah Code Ann. §§75-7-105 (1) & (2) (emphasis added). 
Dorothy cited to the above quoted provision of the Trust, which grants her ultimate 
decision making authority over Trust affairs, in her initial memorandum. Memo in Supp. Of 
Mot. to Dis. at 3. Despite Dorothy's clear citation to the above quoted specific grant of 
authority, Plaintiffs inexplicably elect to ignore the Trust and Utah law, which clearly provides 
that the provisions of the Trust control in the event of conflict with the Utah Trust Code. 
Second, Plaintiffs urge this Court to deny Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss because her 
Motion to Intervene has not yet been granted. Dorothy concedes that in the event her Motion to 
Intervene is denied, she lacks standing to have her Motion to Dismiss adjudicated by this Court. 
Instead Dorothy asserts that she is the real party in interest in this case because she is the sole 
Qualified Beneficiary, as such term is defined by the Utah Code, a grantor of the Trust and the 
trustee with ultimate decision making authority with regard to all matters related to the 
administration of the Trust, therefore she is entitled to intervene as of right in this matter. To 
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deny her Motion to Dismiss on this basis would be a waste of judicial resources, as well as the 
resources of the parties, because this Court is capable of adjudicating Dorothy's Motion to 
Intervene, which has been submitted to this Court, prior to adjudicating her Motion to Dismiss. 
In the event her Motion to Dismiss is denied, on this basis, Dorothy will simply refile upon the 
grant of her Motion to Intervene. 
Third, Plaintiffs make the argument that Dorothy's decision making process in deciding 
that the cost of litigating a $7,000 claim against Mark Westling, a claim that Mark Westling 
admits and fully intends to repay, was somehow flawed, is not relevant. The plain language of 
the Trust does not require Dorothy's decisions as to the administration of the Trust to be 
adjudicated as valid and reasonable before such decisions become effective. See Trust at Article 
XVI(b) Plaintiffs, in advancing this argument, merely attempt to confuse the issue presently 
before this Court, to wit, do Plaintiffs have standing to advance a claim in the name of the Trust. 
The answer is clearly no. 
Although irrelevant, reducing an admitted debt for $7,000 to judgment does not advance 
the interests of the Trust as more than $7,000 will be expended to reduce the debt to judgment, a 
debt which Mark Westling fully acknowledges and desires to repay. Therefore it is indisputable 
that such an action does not reasonably further the interests of the Trust and is therefore both 
reasonable and valid. 
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CONCLUSION 
In an effort to confuse this Court as to the sole issue before it, Plaintiffs ignore 
plain statements made in Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss, misstate Utah law and advance irrelevant 
arguments in an effort to defeat Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss. The sole issue before the Court is 
whether Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman have the authority and therefore the standing to 
maintain this action. Pursuant to Article XVI(b) of the Trust and Utah Code Ann. §§75-7-105 
(1) & (2) and the answer is clearly no. Therefore this Court lacks jurisdictions to adjudicate the 
claims advanced by Plaintiffs. Simply stated, when this Court lacks jurisdiction, it retains only 
the jurisdiction to dismiss. 
DATED this ^ £ day of August, 2009. 
^TB. ALDERMAN 
MATTHEW D.COOK 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
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KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-61II 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
DOROTHY WESTLING'S AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
FOR LACK OF STANDING 
Case No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
STATE OF ARIZONA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY O F f Y Q ( \ C l ^ > > 
DOROTHY WESTLING, having been duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in 
this affidavit. 
2. F am a cotrustee of the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust (the Trust") 
with the authority to make final decisions regarding the administration of the Trust. 
3. Neither Joy Greenwood nor Ellen Hardman sought my consent or approval 
before initiating the above captioned litigation. 
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4. I do not agree with pursuing the above captioned litigation against Mark Westling 
because each of the Co-Trustees agreed to and ratified the transactions complained of in the 
complaint, therefore I deem this litigation to be meritless and a waste of Trust assets. 
5. 1 have analyzed the costs of maintaining this action against Mark Westling, the 
likelihood of succeeding on such claim and the likelihood of being able to collect on any 
potential judgment. I concluded that the costs greatly outweigh any benefits to the Trust in 
maintaining this litigation and therefore have not and do not agree with maintaining this 
litigation. 
DATED t h i s f f P day of July 2009. 
Dorothy Westling 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this§Q_day of July, 2009. 
4815-0689-4340 1 
137 
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO BOX 571708 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040: mike(g),utahattornev.com _ _ 
Counsel for Co-Trustees Hardman and Greenwood 
Served on 08/05/2009 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City UT 84111 -1860 
In-Court Clerk: 238-7503/7504 (Tina/Tamara) W48 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MS. WESTLING'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Civil No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, by and through counsel, 
hereby submits its memorandum in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed by 
Dorothy Westling and requests the Court to deny the Motion. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiff, being the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust ("Trust"), filed 
its Complaint against Mark Westling on April 7, 2009; Mr. Westling was served on 
April 16, 2009 in Arizona. 
2. An Answer was filed on May 13, 2009 by Defendant Mark Westling. 
3. On May 19,2009, Defendant filed a Motion to Consolidate this case with 
Case No. 093900329, a probate action for the purpose of removing Mark Westling and 
Dorothy Westling as Co-Trustees of The Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust 
("Trust"), a Trust that is now irrevocable. 
4. The Motion to Consolidate was denied by Judge Trease. 
5. Dorothy Westling is currently the subject of a challenge to her cognitive abilities 
to know and understand any aspects of the Trust's administration which has been and is 
exclusively administered by the two Co-Trustees who initiated this action on behalf of the 
Trust. 
6. If Ms. Westling is removed as a Co-Trustee, as anticipated, she will have no say 
nor any control over the administration of the Trust, and this will be consistent with her 
prior lack of involvement in the administration of the Trust. 
7. The purpose of this action is to recover for the benefit of the Trust the debt owed 
to the Trust by Defendant, Mark Westling, who is also a Co-Trustee. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Ms. Westling is not a party to these proceedings and therefore she lacks standing 
to bring her motion to dismiss, 
Dorothy Westling is not a party to these proceedings. While she has filed, pursuant to 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to intervene, the Court has not yet ruled 
on that motion. Therefore, Ms. Westling's motion to dismiss is premature, since she is not a 
party and she has no standing to assert a motion to dismiss. It is ironic that the basis for 
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Ms. Westling's motion to dismiss is based on a lack of standing while she herself lacks 
standing to file her motion. 
II. The terms of the Trust do not require prior consent by Ms. Westling before 
commencing an action to collect a debt to the Trust. 
Ms. Westling exclaims that she did not consent to this action and therefore the two 
co-trustees lack authority to commence this action. See Ms, Westling Mem. at 3. However, 
Ms. Westling fails to cite any provision of the Trust agreement that requires Ms. Westling's 
consent. Further, Article XIV of the Trust expressly provides that the co-trustees "shall 
have all of the rights and powers conferred upon them by [the Trust Code]." 
Section 75-7-809, Utah Code Ann., expressly states that "A trustee shall take 
reasonable steps to enforce claims of the trust and to defend claims against the trust." And, 
§ 75-7-809, Utah Code Ann., also expressly provides specific powers granted to a trustee to 
collect trust property and to prosecute claims of the trust. Accordingly, the cotrustees 
clearly have authority and a duty to enforce claims of the Trust. Therefore, they have 
standing to do so and this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs claims. 
The Trust Code provides that cotrustees who unable to reach a unanimous decision 
may act by majority decision. § 75-7-703, Utah Code Ann. Therefore, cotrustees have 
standing to commence actions. Further, § 75-7-703(4) provides that: 
If a cotrustee is unavailable to perform duties because of absence, illness, 
disqualification under other law, or other temporary incapacity, or if a 
cotrustee fails or refuses to act after reasonable notice, and prompt action 
is necessary to achieve the purposes of the trust or to avoid injury to the 
trust property, the remaining cotrustee or a majority of the remaining 
cotrustees may act for the trust. 
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Therefore, the two cotrustees who commenced this action fall within the "remaining 
cotrustee or a majority of the remaining cotrustees." Either way, they have standing to 
commence this action. 
III. The issue of whether Ms. Westling has actually "analyzed the costs of 
maintaining this action against Mark Westling" is an issue of fact. 
Ms. Westling asserts in her affidavit that she has "analyzed the costs of maintaining 
this action against Mark Westling.55 See Ms. Westling Aff. at 2. Plaintiffs contend that 
Ms. Westling is incapable of such analysis and she has not in fact conducted any analysis. 
Plaintiffs further contend that Ms. Westling has no idea what is contained in the Trust. This 
assertion is corroborated by the recent examination of Ms. Westling by Dr. Gottlieb in 
which he states: "In describing her Trust, she states that, at this time, that she has no idea 
exactly what is in the Trust." Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Westling will sign any document 
put in front of her by her son, Mark Westling, who is the very defendant in this action. The 
Court should note that the Ms. Westling signed her affidavit in Arizona where she is living 
with her son, Mark Westling. 
Further, Ms. Westling is entirely dependent on Mark Westling for her care, her room 
and board, her transportation, her medications and so forth. "A confidential relationship 
arises when one party, having gained the trust and confidence of another, exercises 
extraordinary influence over the other party." Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 85, 
PI8, 69 P.3d 286 (quotations and citation omitted). In effect, a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship now exists between Ms. Westling and Mark. "If a confidential relationship is 
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found, any transaction that benefits the party in whom trust is reposed is presumed to have 
been unfair and to have resulted from undue influence and fraud." Webster v. Lehmer, 
742 P.2d 1203,1206 (Utah 1987) (quoting Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 
401 P.2d 710, 713 (1965). Since Mark has received financial benefits from Ms. Westling 
under the current relationship, the law presumes that he has exercised undue influence over 
her. In effect, the burden now shifts to Mark to show that he has not exercised undue 
influence over his mother. 
Since there is a question about Ms. Westling's cognitive ability to analyze the issues 
presented in this action and since there is a question whether Mark has exercised undue 
influence over Ms. Westling, material issues of fact exist that must be subjected to 
discovery. In effect, Ms. Westling's motion to dismiss for lack of standing contains mixed 
issues of fact and law. The cotrustees who commenced this action clearly have legal 
standing to do so, and issues of fact exist over Ms. Westling's cognitive ability to 
understand the administration of the Trust, to analyze the costs of this action, and whether 
Mark has exercised undue influence over Ms. Westling. Such issues of fact are subject to 
discovery and findings by the Court. 
DATED this 5th day of August 2009. 
Michael A. Jensei/ ~/ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
NESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant* 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by Dorothy 
Westling seeking a ruling on her Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing. 
The Court notes that Ms. Westling previously filed a Motion ta Intervene, 
which the Coui t granted in a Minute Entry Decision and Order, dated 
August 18, 2009. Having reviewed the moving and responding Memoranda 
concerning the Motion to Dismiss, the causfe Wles as stated herein. 
In her Motion to Dismiss,-Ms. Westling argues that the Co-Trustees 
of the plaintiff The Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust (the 
"Trust"), Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman, lack standing to initiate this 
action on behalf of the Trust. Specifically, Ms. Westling, who is the 
Grantor, Co-TruStee and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Trust, asserts 
that according to Article XVI of the Trust documents, if the Co-Trustees 
are unable to agree on any matter pertaining to the administration of the 
Trust, then she has ultimate decision-making authority. Ms. We&tling 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 090905677 
WESTLING TRUST V. WESTLING PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
indicated that she does not consent to the litigation being initiated on 
behalf of the Trust against Mark Westling, who is her son and a fourth 
Co-Trustee of the Trust, 
The Trust, through Ms. Greenwood and Ms. Hardman, advances several 
arguments in opposition to Ms. Westling's Motion. One of these 
arguments, that Ms. Westling is not a party to these proceedings, is now 
moot in light of the Court's decision to permit Ms. West Ling to intervene 
in this action. The Trust also alludes to parallel proceedings in 
probate court which challenge Ms. Westling's "cognitive abilities" and 
seek to remove both her and Mark Westling as Co-Trustees of the Trust. 
After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the Court 
determines that Article XVI (b) of the Trust documents is dispositive. 
Ms. Westling's decisions concerning the administration of the Trust 
govern so long as she is alive and competent. There has been no 
adjudication on the issue of Ms. Westling' s competency at this point and 
the mere fact that she has a familial relationship with the defendant 
does not undermine the Trust language which gives her ultimate decision-
making authority concerning the Trust. Further, Article XVI(b) prevails 
over any provision of Utah trust law that may be to the contrary. 
Finally, the reasonableness of Ms. Westling' s decision to not pursue 
litigation is irrelevant to the pivotal issue of whether the Co-Trustees 
have standing to bring this action in the absence of Ms. Westling's 
consent. On that issue, the Court rules that pursuant to Article XVI(b) 
WESTLING TRUST V. WESTLING PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
of the Trust, Ms. Greenwood and Ms. Hardman do not have the authority and 
therefore the standing to bring this action on behalf of the Trust. 
Since this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims advanced by the 
Trust, Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this // day of September, 2009. 
TYRONE! E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
'htrd Judicial District 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO BOX 571708 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; mike@utahattornev.com 
Counsel for Co-Trustees Hardman and Greenwood 
Served on 09/14/2009 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City UT 84111 -1860 
In-Court Clerk: 238-7503/7504 (Tina/Tamara) W48 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
Dorothy Westling, 
Intervener 
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59 MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE OR VACATE THE 
COURT'S RULING GRANTING 
MS. WESTLING'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Civil No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, by and through 
counsel, hereby submits its Motion to Set Aside or Vacate the Court's Ruling Granting 
Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss. 
The "error of law" asserted by Plaintiff is that the Motion to Dismiss should have 
been treated as a motion for summary judgment as required by Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff is submitting concurrently with this motion its memorandum in support. 
195 
DATED this 14th day of September 2009. 
Michael A. Jensi 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, hereby certify that on this day I personally served the 
foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59 MOTION TO SET ASD3E OR VACATE THE 
COURT'S RULING GRANTING MS. WESTLING'S MOTION TO DISMISS by 
causing a copy to be mailed to: 
Elizabeth S. Conley 
Attorney at Law 
3604 Astro Cir 
Salt Lake City UT 84109-3843 
(801) 272-0719: e conley@.comcastJiet 
Attorney for Mark Westling 
Kent B. Alderman 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 So. Main Street, Ste. 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
(801) 532-1234; kalderman@pblutah.com 
DATED this 14th day of September 2009. 
Michael A. Jensen (I 
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO BOX 571708 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; mike@utahattornev.com 
Counsel for Co-Trustees Hardman and Greenwood 
j . . . Served on 09/14/2009 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PO Box I860, Salt Lake City UT 84111-1860 
In-Court Clerk: 238-7503/7504 (Tina/Tamara) W48 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
Dorothy Westling, 
Intervener 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RULE 59 MOTION 
Civil No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, by and through counsel, 
hereby submits its memorandum in support of its Rule 59 Motion and requests the Court to 
grant the Motion. 
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion is brought pursuant to 
Rule 59(a)(7), "an error of law." The error of law asserted by Plaintiff is that the Motion to 
Dismiss should have been treated as a motion for summary judgment. 
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MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiff, being the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust ("Trust"), filed 
its Complaint against Mark Westling on April 7, 2009; Mr. Westling was served on 
April 16,2009 in Arizona. 
2. An Answer was filed on May 13, 2009 by Defendant Mark Westling. 
3. On May 19, 2009, Defendant filed a Motion to Consolidate this case with 
Case No. 093900329, a probate action for the purpose of removing Mark Westling and 
Dorothy Westling as Co-Trustees of The Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust 
("Trust"), a Trust that is now irrevocable. 
4. Pursuant to Rule 42, the Motion to Consolidate was denied by Judge Trease. 
5. On July 8, 2009, Ms. Westling served her Motion to Intervene. 
6. On July 27, 2009, Ms. Westling served her Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss. 
7. On August 6, 2009, Ms. Westling served her Request to Submit on her Motion to 
Intervene. 
8. On August 18,2009, the Court granted Ms. Westling's Motion to Intervene. 
9. On September 11, 2009, the Court, without hearing, granted Ms. Westling's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Ms. Westling's Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss should have been treated as a 
Rule 56 Motion, since matters outside the pleading were presented and not 
excluded by the Court 
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
... .If, ona motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for 
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a 
motion by Rule 56. 
Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss was expressly brought pursuant to Rule 12(b). 
Her Motion to Dismiss was supported by her affidavit, which is clearly material outside 
of the pleadings.1 Furthermore, the Court, in its Minute Entry Ruling, relied on the 
affidavit of Ms. Westling by stating: "Ms. Westling indicated that she does not consent to 
the litigation being initiated on behalf of the Trust against Mark Westling, who is her son 
and a fourth Co-Trustee of the Trust." 
Accordingly, the Court should have treated Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss as a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff should have been given "reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." 
1
 Ms. Westling has never filed an Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint. Furthermore, she 
filed her Motion to Dismiss at a time when she was not a party to these proceedings. However, 
"persons who are not parties of record to a suit have no standing therein which will enable them 
to take part in . . . the proceedings. If they have occasion to ask relief in relation to the matters 
involved, they must either contrive to obtain the status of parties in the suit or they must institute 
an independent suit." In effect, Ms. Westling's motion was improperly before the Court. 
Overturfv Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr, 1999 UT 3 J 5 
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II. As a Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiff could rely on Rule 56(f) as a 
means of conducting some discovery to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss claims that Plaintiff lacks standing, since she did 
not consent to filing this action against Mark Westling. However, standing is generally 
considered to be a mixed question of law and fact"... because it involves the application 
of a legal standard to a particularized set of facts. For example, when reviewing a lower 
court's standing determination we have stated that 'the question of whether a given 
individual or association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question 
of law, although there may be factual findings that bear on the issue.'5' (citing 
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997). Utah Chapter of the 
Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74 % 13; 148 P3d 960, 966. 
In the absence of Ms. Westling's affidavit, Plaintiff clearly has standing to initiate 
this action against Mark Westling. § 75-7-809, Utah Code Ann., expressly states that "A 
trustee shall take reasonable steps to enforce claims of the trust and to defend claims 
against the trust." And, § 75-7-809, Utah Code Ann., also expressly provides specific 
powers granted to a trustee to collect trust property and to prosecute claims of the trust. 
Accordingly, the cotrustees clearly have authority and a duty to enforce claims of the 
Trust. Therefore, they have standing to do so and this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate 
Plaintiffs claims. 
The only way to defeat Plaintiffs standing is for the Court to consider outside 
material, such as Ms. Westling's affidavit. In doing so, however, the Court should 
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reasonably allow Plaintiff to conduct discovery. In particular, Plaintiff wishes to depose 
Ms. Westling to determine if she really understands what is stated in her affidavit or 
whether such words were written by her attorney and she merely signed the document in 
Arizona under the control of her son, Mark Westling. That is a fair and reasonable 
inquiry. As provided by Rule 56(f), the Court should allow such discovery and the 
preparation of controverting affidavits. 
III. The issue of whether Ms. Westling has actually "analyzed the costs of 
maintaining this action against Mark Westling" is clearly an issue of fact 
Ms. Westling asserts in her affidavit that she has "analyzed the costs of maintaining 
this action against Mark Westling." Plaintiff contends that Ms. Westling is incapable of 
such analysis and she has not in fact conducted any analysis. Plaintiffs further contends 
that Ms. Westling has no idea what is contained in the Trust. This assertion is 
corroborated by the recent examination of Ms. Westling by Dr. Gottlieb in which he 
states: "In describing her Trust, she states that, at this time, that she has no idea exactly 
what is in the Trust." Plaintiff contends that Ms. Westling will sign any document put in 
front of her by her son, Mark Westling, who is the very defendant in this action. The 
Court should note that the Ms. Westling signed her affidavit in Arizona where she is 
living with her son, Mark Westling. 
Further, Ms. Westling is entirely dependent on Mark Westling for her care, her room 
and board, her transportation, her medications and so forth. frA confidential relationship 
arises when one party, having gained the trust and confidence of another, exercises 
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extraordinary influence over the other party." Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 85, 
PI 8, 69 P.3d 286 (quotations and citation omitted). In effect, a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship now exists between Ms. Westling and Mark. "If a confidential relationship is 
found, any transaction that benefits the party in whom trust is reposed is presumed to have 
been unfair and to have resulted from undue influence and fraud." Webster v. Lehmer, 
742 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1987) (quoting Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 
401 P.2d 710, 713 (1965). Since Mark has received financial benefits from Ms. Westling 
under the current relationship, the law presumes that he has exercised undue influence 
over her. In effect, the burden now shifts to Mark to show that he has not exercised 
undue influence over his mother. 
Since there are genuine issues of material facts, it is premature for the Court to 
dismiss this action based on a lack of standing until Plaintiff has had an opportunity to 
conduct discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Court relied on material outside of the pleadings, le., outside of Plaintiff s 
Complaint since Ms. Westling filed no pleading in this action, it should have treated the 
motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and then allowed Plaintiff the 
opportunity to proceed under Rule 56. Furthermore, standing is a mixed question of law 
and fact, and Ms. Westling's affidavit presented facts not excluded by the Court and 
instead relied upon by the Court. Therefore, the Court should set aside or vacate its ruling 
and proceed under Rule 56. 
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DATED this 14th day of September 2009. 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, hereby certify that on this day I personally served the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RULE 59 MOTION by causing a 
copy to be mailed to: 
Elizabeth S. Conley 
Attorney at Law 
3604 Astro Cir 
Salt Lake City UT 84109-3843 
(801) 272-0719; e conlev@comcast.net 
Attorney for Mark Westling 
Kent B. Alderman 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
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P. O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
(801) 532-1234; kalderman@pblutah.com 
DATED this 14th day of September 2009. 
Michael A. Jensen 
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO BOX 571708 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; mikefg.utahattornev.com 
Counsel for Co-Trustees Hardman and Greenwood 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City UT 84111-1860 
In-Court Clerk: 238-7503/7504 (Tina/Tamara) W48 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
\r 
V • 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
Dorothy Westling, 
Intervener 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF RULE 59 MOTION 
Civil No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, by and through counsel, 
hereby submits its Reply Memorandum in support of its Rule 59 Motion and requests the 
Court to grant the Motion. 
Dorothy Westling's Motion to Dismiss was brought before the Court pursuant to 
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Both her Motion and Memorandum in Support 
begin with "Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." And, her Reply 
Memorandum begins with "Pursuant to Rule 7 and Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." Therefore, Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss clearly falls within Rule 12. 
However, nowhere in Rule 12 does it refer to "standing," and Ms. Westling cites no 
other Rule under which her motion is brought. 
Most importantly, standing, particularly in this case, is a mixed question of fact and 
law. As a threshold matter, the Court must first look at the Complaint to determine if 
Plaintiff has standing to bring this action. The Complaint is the only pleading, since 
Ms. Westling has not filed any pleading in this case. On the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff 
clearly has standing to initiate this action against Mark Westling, since § 75-7-809, Utah 
Code Ann., expressly states that "a trustee shall take reasonable steps to enforce claims of 
the trust and to defend claims against the trust." Further, § 75-7-809, Utah Code Ann., also 
expressly provides specific powers granted to a trustee to collect trust property and to 
prosecute claims of the trust. Accordingly, the cotrustees clearly have authority and a duty 
to enforce claims of the Trust. Therefore, based solely on the Complaint itself and without 
looking to any other materials, Plaintiff has standing. The only way to defeat the statutory 
presumption that Plaintiff has standing is to examine materials outside the Complaint. 
Next, the Court may look to other materials outside of the pleadings to determine if 
there is something that would defeat Plaintiffs standing. In this case, the Court looked to 
the affidavit of Ms. Westling that was attached to her Memorandum in Support of her 
Motion to Dismiss. Once the Court relied on Ms. Westling's affidavit, since that is the only 
source of evidence presented to defeat Plaintiffs statutory standing, the Court must as a 
matter of law treat the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. The Court's 
jurisdiction must then continue unless it finds that Plaintiff lacks standing. 
- 2 -
CONCLUSION 
When the Court relied on the affidavit of Ms. Westling, it should have treated the 
motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and then allowed Plaintiff the 
opportunity to proceed under Rule 56. Therefore, the Court should set aside or vacate its 
ruling and proceed under Rule 56. 
DATED this 21st day of September 2009. 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant. 
DOROTHY WESTLING'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
RULE 59 MOTION 
Case No. 090905677 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Dorothy Westling ("Dorothy5'), 
as Grantor, Co-Trustee with final decision making authority over the administration of the Trust, 
and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust (the 
"Trust"), by and through counsel, respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman's (collectively "Plaintiffs") Rule 59 Motion. 
Dorothy filed her motion to intervene and memorandum in support thereof on July 27, 
2009. Dorothy's Motion to Intervene was granted by this Court on August 18, 2009. 
Subsequent to the filing of Dorothy's Motion to Intervene, Dorothy filed her Motion to Dismiss. 
The basis for her Motion to Dismiss was simply that Plaintiffs lacked standing to file a complaint 
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in the name of the Trust. Indeed, under Utah law a plaintiff, "must have standing to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). 
A plaintiff cannot merely hope to obtain standing at some date subsequent to the filing of his/her 
complaint. Id. Pursuant to this Court's Order of Dismissal entered on September 11, 2009 (the 
"Order of Dismissal") Plaintiff s complaint was dismissed for lack of standing, hence this Court 
determined that it did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Plaintiffs now ask this Court to set aside the Order of Dismissal claiming that it should 
have been treated as a motion for summary judgment and further ask this Court to reconsider the 
merits of its Order of Dismissal. Stated simply, Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion is frivolous because, 
as conclusively established below, it is directly contrary to well established Utah case law and 
further requests this Court to reconsider the merits of its Order of Dismissal when the Utah 
Supreme Court has explicitly expressed its disdain for motions to reconsider. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion is based on a claimed "error of law" that Dorothy's Motion to 
Dismiss should have been treated as a motion for summary judgment,1 While its is true that, 
when affidavits or other evidence is presented in conjunction with a motion to dismiss filed 
under rule 12(b)(6) and the court does not exclude them, the motion is generally treated as a 
motion for summary judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, it is clear that 
1
 Plaintiffs also assert that Dorothy does not have standing to assert a lack of standing in this case because she is not 
a party. This argument is frivolous as Dorothy's Motion to Intervene was granted on August 18,2009, nearly a 
month before her Motion to Dismiss was decided. Further, Plaintiffs misrepresent the holding of the case they cite 
in support of their frivolous argument. Specifically, Overturfv. Univ.ofUtah Medical Center, 1999 UT 3, 973 P.2d 
413, did not involve a motion to intervene, but rather involved an appeal filed by a party who had no involvement 
(i.e. not a party or intervenor) in the district court case. The Court of Appeals held," Thus if Oxedine wished to be 
involved in the wrongful death action... she had to intervene and be made a party." Id. at f 5 This is exactly what 
Dorothy did in this case, she timely intervened. 
2 
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Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss was based solely on Plaintiffs' lack of standing to assert claims in 
the name of the Trust, not on Rule 12(b)(6). See Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b), 56(c); World Peace 
Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253,256 n. 2 (Utah 1994); Warren v. Provo 
City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1127 n. 2 (Utah 1992); Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 
997, 999 (Utah 1991). 
Under Utah law a plaintiff, "must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court." 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). Stated another way, if a plaintiff lacks 
standing, this Court does not have jurisdiction over a plaintiffs complaint. Further, "When we 
lack jurisdiction, we retain only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. 
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
It is clear that Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss was based upon a lack of standing and hence 
jurisdiction and not on a failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Rules 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This precise issue was decided in Spoons, 
where the Court stated: 
Ms. Spoons' first argument mistakenly assumes that a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under rule 12(b)(1) is 
converted to a motion for summary judgment if affidavits are 
attached. Rule 12, however, does not convert motions based on 
subsections (b)(1) through (5) into motions for summary judgment 
simply because they include some affirmative evidence relating to 
the basis for the motion. 
Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, 987 P.2d 36; Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App 86, 67 P.3d 1042 
cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946 (2003). 
Because Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss was based solely on her claim that this Court 
lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' complaint, Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss appropriately 
3 
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included her affidavit attesting to the fact that she did not consent to Plaintiffs filing their 
complaint in the name of the Trust. Pursuant to Spoons v. Lewis, her Motion to Dismiss, which 
was based solely on her claim that this Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues raised by 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, cannot be converted into a motion for summary judgment merely because 
she filed an affidavit in conjunction with the filing of her Motion to Dismiss. 
The remainder of Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion is dedicated to reasserting arguments that 
this Court has already expressly rejected. Therefore, it is more properly characterized as a 
motion to reconsider. Apart from Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion being contrary to Utah law, as 
conclusively established in both Dorothy's memorandum and reply memorandum in support of 
her motion to dismiss, and contrary to this Court's Order of dismissal, Plaintiffs' arguments are 
frivolous as the Utah Supreme Court has already expressed its candid view of motions to 
reconsider.2 Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The filing of postjudgment motions to reconsider has become a 
common litigation practice, notwithstanding the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure's failure to authorize it and our previous attempts 
to discourage it... [We] warned that this practice could "seriously 
compromise" the position of a litigant. 
Gillett v. Price, 135 P.3d 861, 861-862 and 864 (Utah 2006). 
Gillett noted that the holding does not relate to non-final decisions if sanction by the 
rules, such as Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide in pertinent part: 
In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or 
other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer 
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
2
 Dorothy has elected not to reargue the Motion to Dismiss herein as there is no legal basis under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure for allowing Plaintiffs another bite at the apple in rearguing the Motion to Dismiss by reasserting 
arguments previously rejected by this Court and raising new arguments raised for the first time in Plaintiffs' Rule 59 
Motion. 
4 
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parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 54(b). 
The Utah Supreme Court further stated: 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Gillett: 
Hereafter, when a party seeks relief from a judgment, it must turn 
to the rules to determine whether relief exists, and if so, direct the 
court to the specific relief available. Parties can no longer leave 
this task to the court by filing so-called motions to reconsider and 
relying upon the district court to construe the motions within the 
rules. 
Gillett v. Price, 135 P.3d 861, 863 (Utah 2006). 
This Court's Order of Dismissal is a final order as it dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint in its 
entirety. Despite the Utah Supreme Court's clear expression of contempt for motions to 
reconsider, Plaintiffs attempt to dispute the legal merits of this Court's Order of Dismissal. 
Therefore this Court should disregard Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss raised solely the issue of Plaintiffs' standing, 
hence this Court's jurisdiction, to file a complaint in the name of the Trust, it is clear that 
Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss cannot be converted into a motion for summary judgment. Indeed, 
"Rule 12, however, does not convert motions based on subsections (b)(1) through (5) into 
motions for summary judgment simply because they include some affirmative evidence relating 
to the basis for the motion." Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, 987 P.2d 36; Walter v. Stewart, 2003 
UT App 86, 67 P.3d 1042 cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946 (2003). 
5 
4829-9433-0372.1 
Rfl77 
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion should be denied. 
DATED this 16th day of September, 2009 
KENT B. ALDERMAN 
MATTHEW D. COOK 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this jv_ day of September, 2009,1 caused to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, and E-Mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Dorothy Westling's 
Motion in Opposition to Rule 59 Motion, to: 
Michael A. Jensen 
mike@utahattorney.com 
136 So. Main Street, Suite 430 
P.O. Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-0708 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Elizabeth S. Conley 
e__conley@comcast.net 
3604 Astro Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Attorney for Mark Westling fe^^L^^f^ ^  
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY : MINUTE ENTRY 
WESTLING FAMILY TRUST, 
: CASE NO. 090905677 
Plaintiff, 
9 
VS. 
MARK WESTLING, 
Defendant -
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by the 
plaintiff seeking a ruling on its Rule 59 Motion to Set Aside or Vacate 
the Court's Ruling Granting Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss. Having 
reviewed the moving and responding Mempranda, the Court rules as stated 
herein. 
In its Rule 59 Motion, the plaintiff asserts that since the 
interveftor Dorothy Westling's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing was 
accompanied by her Affidavit, which was not specifically excluded from 
consideration by this Court, the Motion should have been converted to a 
Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Westling counters with 
persuasive case law that Motions brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) 
through (5) are not xconverted into Summary Judgment Motions simply 
because Affidavits are attached See Spoons v. Lewis, S#7 P.2d 36 (Utah 
1999). 
WESTLING TRUST V. WESTL3NG PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
In this case, Ms. Westlmg s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing 
challenged the plaintiff's standing to initiate this action under Article 
XVI of the relevant Trust documents. The Court's decision, in 
considering the issue of standLng and hence this Court's jurisdiction 
over this matter, did not hinge on Ms Westlmg's Affidavit, but was 
instead focused on the Trust language to determine whether she had 
ultimate decision-making authority with respect to Trust matters. 
Moreover, pursuant to Spoons, which the plamtitf has not addressed or 
Countered, the Court was permitted to look beyond the pleadings to 
determine matters of standing. The Court concludes that the inclusion 
of Ms. Westling's Affidavit in conjunction with her Motion did not 
require this Court to convert her Motion to one for Summary Judgment. 
Further, the plaintiff's remaining assertion, that there exist issues of 
fact as to the validity of Ms, Westling's decisions, amounts to a re-
argument of it£ prior position, which the Court previously rejected as 
irrelevant. 
Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion is denied. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this <^' day of October,^2009, 
DHO 
